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ABSTRACT 
Scholars have noted that judicial conservatism has eroded labor and 
employment law (hereinafter referred to as “work law”) in the U.S. and 
elsewhere. The Roberts Court has maintained, and perhaps augmented, 
the Court’s conservative outlook, deciding a number of key work law 
cases in favor of employers. Moreover, the pro-employer judicial hue over 
recent work law cases comes on the heels of recent legal scholarship 
calling for a rethinking of the “idea of labor law,” the demise of the 
standard employment contract, and a surge in precarious jobs. Work law, 
which has always been under attack, has had better days in the U.S.; 
however, work law has experienced a rebirth in Latin America after years 
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of neoliberalism and authoritarian rule. There may be lessons that can be 
drawn from the Latin American experience for the U.S. and other 
jurisdictions where work law has suffered setbacks.  
One of the key institutionalized methodologies that has helped to 
reconstruct work law in Latin America has been the use of legal 
principles. This Article discusses the principle of protection, which is 
perhaps the central pillar of Latin American work law. Under this 
principle, one of work law’s essential functions is to protect workers 
because they are “weaker parties” whose human dignity is at stake.  
Jurists in Latin America operationalize the protective principle through 
the rule of in dubio pro operario, which essentially means that a judge or 
other adjudicator must rule in favor of the worker when confronted with 
hard cases. In dubio pro operario compels adjudicators to limit their 
discretion in a manner consistent with the protective principle. 
After describing Latin American work law’s protective principle, the 
authors turn to U.S. work law, namely scholarship, the Thirteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to explain how a 
Latin American labor judge would likely find and apply the protective 
principle in the U.S. The authors argue that a Latin American labor judge 
would first find a constitutional mandate to protect workers in the 
Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban against involuntary servitude stems from a larger 
constitutional goal of safeguarding human dignity. The protective 
principle also safeguards human dignity; therefore, the Latin American 
labor judge would feel compelled to interpret existing work law in a 
manner consistent with that constitutional mandate to safeguard human 
dignity. A Latin American labor judge would also recognize that the FLSA 
and the NLRA attempt to equalize bargaining power between workers and 
employers. Therefore, a labor judge would also find the protective 
principle in those two laws. 
The authors further argue that Latin American labor jurists would 
recognize that a canon of statutory interpretation, such as in dubio pro 
operario, sometimes prevails in the U.S under the common law maxim that 
“remedial statutes should be interpreted liberally.” However, a Latin 
American jurist would recognize that work law deserves perhaps an even 
more “liberal” interpretation than other statutes because work law aims 
to safeguard human dignity and to equalize bargaining relationships—
high-order goals which other statutes may not have. 
The authors recognize that U.S. courts do not always interpret work 
law in the manner most favorable to the worker. Courts fail to protect 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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workers because, among other reasons, common law judges are not 
trained to seek and understand the specific legal principles inherent in 
U.S. work law. Moreover, the unique American employment-at-will 
doctrine further weakens work law. Employment-at-will should be 
statutorily rescinded to provide a more clearly protective work law in the 
U.S.  
The authors conclude by arguing that despite the legal-cultural 
differences between the U.S. and Latin America, a protective principle 
exists in the U.S.; however, it has been recognized in a spotty fashion by 
the courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of 
Rights solemnly committed the United States to be a country where 
the dignity and rights of all persons were equal before all authority. 
In all candor we must all concede that part of this egalitarianism in 
America has been more pretension than realized fact.”  
—Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.1 
 
The Roberts Court
2
 has asserted itself quite forcefully in recent labor 
and employment law (hereinafter referred to as “work law”)3 cases. In one 
of its most controversial cases, Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
4
 the Court struck down 
the largest sexual discrimination class action lawsuit in U.S. history when 
it decided that the plaintiffs’ alleged claims did not share sufficient 
“commonality” to survive class certification.5 More recently, the Court 
increased the evidentiary threshold for employees to prove a retaliation 
claim under Title VII
6
 and narrowed the concept of what is a “supervisor,” 
 
 
 1. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 
S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986). 
 2. Refers to the Supreme Court of the United States since 2005, when John G. Roberts was 
appointed as Chief Justice of the Court. See The Supreme Court of the United States, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited on Mar. 21, 2014). 
 3. The term “work law,” “workplace law,” and the “the law of the workplace” have been 
increasingly adopted by American legal scholars who want to use a more encompassing term to refer 
to labor and employment law. See Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of 
American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 166–67 (2007) (adopting the term “work 
law” to refer to labor and employment law); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing: 
Nationalizing Workplace Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2010) (adopting the term “workplace 
law” to refer to labor and employment law); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of The Workplace in 
an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 320–21 (2005) (adopting the term “the law of the 
workplace” to refer to labor and employment law). 
 4. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 5. Commonality is the rule requiring a purported class to show that there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class. Id. at 2550–51 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has specified 
that commonality requires that members of the purported plaintiff class suffered the same injury. Id. at 
2551, citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). In Dukes, 
Plaintiffs alleged that Wal-mart gave too much discretion to supervisors with gender biases, which 
affected the promotion of female employees in all of Wal-mart. However, the Court determined that 
plaintiffs could not specifically determine how gender bias “played a meaningful role in Wal-mart’s 
employment decisions.” Moreover, it noted that the firm had an anti-discrimination policy that covered 
all of its stores, curtailing the gender bias claim. Id. at 2553 (internal citations omitted). For a critique 
of the Court’s deference to company anti-discrimination policies, see Lauren Edelman et al., When 
Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AMER. J. OF 
SOCIOLOGY 888, 889 (2011).  
 6. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). In Vance, the Supreme Court’s majority 
ruled that employees who control the day-to-day activities of other employees would no longer be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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making it more difficult for plaintiff-employees to prevail against 
employers and their agents.
7
 Similarly, in American Express v. Italian 
Colors,
8
 the Supreme Court validated class action waivers challenged by 
the plaintiffs even when the cost of individual arbitration for the plaintiffs 
exceeded the value of any potential remedy for the plaintiffs if they 
pursued individual claims through arbitration.
9
 While American Express 
was concerned with commercial law and not a work law issue per se, 
experts have opined that the case could have a strong impact on the 
viability of employee waivers and could limit the capacity of workers to 
vindicate their rights.
10
 Not only scholars, but also news outlets, such as 
 
 
classified as “supervisors” under Title VII, striking out existing Equal Employment Opportunity Office 
guidelines. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated in her dissent:  
The Court today strikes from the supervisory category employees who control the day-to-day 
schedules and assignments of others, confining the category to those formally empowered to 
take tangible employment actions. The limitation the Court decrees diminishes the force of 
[prior Supreme Court decisions], ignores the conditions under which members of the work 
force labor, and disserves the objective of Title VII to prevent discrimination from infecting 
the Nation's workplaces. I would follow the EEOC's Guidance and hold that the authority to 
direct an employee's daily activities establishes supervisory status under Title VII.  
Id. at 2455. Justice Ginsburg also argued that Vance narrowed the concept of supervisor in relation to 
Supreme Court precedent. Id. Commentators have agreed with the dissenting Justice. See A. E. Dick 
Howard, Ten Things the 2012–13 Term Tells Us About the Roberts Court, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 
53–54 (2013); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Affects Each of Us, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 361, 375 (2013) 
[hereinafter Chemerinsky, The Court Affects Each of Us]. 
 7. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (establishing a “but for” 
standard for retaliation claims under Title VII that is stricter than the “motivating factor” test generally 
required to prove discrimination claims under the same statute). See Smith v. Xerox Corp. 602 F.3d 
320, 326 (5th Cir. 2010) (Fifth Circuit case abrogated by Nassar, which applied a motivating factor 
test). See also EEOC Comp. Man., Section 8: Retaliation § 8-16 (May 20, 1998) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html (determining, prior to Nassar, that “[i]f there 
is credible direct evidence that retaliation was a motive for the challenged action, ‘cause’ should be 
found” for retaliation claims under Title VII. In her dissent of Nassar, Justice Ginsburg argued that the 
Court majority was narrowing the standard, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove retaliation. 
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535. In her view, retaliation was discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 2537, 
citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63, (2006). The dissenting 
Justice argued that the standard to prove one or the other should be the same. Id. See also 
Chemerinsky, The Court Affects Each of Us, supra note 6, at 375. 
 8. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
 9. Id. at 2312. See also AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (finding 
California law that invalidates class action waivers violates the Federal Arbitration Act). 
 10. See Carolyn Shapiro, Arbitration Uber Alles in the Supreme Court, IIT CHICAGO-KENT 
FACULTY BLOG (June 21, 2013), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/2013/06/21/arbitration-uber-alles-
in-the-supreme-court/. Professor Harry Arthurs has also argued that work law is or should be part of a 
general law of “economic subordination and resistance” that protects economically subordinated 
groups. Harry W. Arthurs, Labour Law as the Law of Economic Subordination and Resistance: A 
Counterfactual?, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 585 (2013). Hence work law, consumer protection 
laws, and other laws that protect economically subordinated groups are linked. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The New York Times, have reported on what appears to be an especially 
pro-business bias in the Roberts Court.
11
 
These recent judicial erosions of work law and other laws that protect 
economically subordinated groups are not new phenomena. Many scholars 
have previously denounced and lamented judicial inroads into work law 
that resulted in diminished worker protections.
12
 For example the German-
British scholar, Otto Kahn-Freund, advocated for government abstention 
from the workplace and the resolution of workplace problems through 
collective bargaining because judges systematically decided cases and 
controversies in favor of employers.
13
  
 
 
 11. Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-
supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (citing Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013)); see also A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The 
Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 76, 80–81 (2013). “One way of posing the question 
about the Court and business is to ask how the United States Chamber of Commerce—an active 
participant on today’s legal scene—fared in the 2011–12 Term. The Chamber took a position in nine 
cases, and it was on the winning side of every case in which the Court addressed issues on which the 
Chamber had taken a position. Even more striking is the fact that, in every case in which the 
Chamber’s position diverged from that of the Solicitor General, the Court sided with the Chamber. 
Given the Solicitor General’s typically high success rate in the Court, this configuration is 
remarkable.”)(internal citations omitted); Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice for Big Business, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 1, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/opinion/justice-for-big-business.html? 
ref=opinion&_r=0. 
 12. For the case of how courts have diminished worker protections in the NLRA, see Karl Klare, 
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–
1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 291–92 (1977); JIM ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS OF 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW Chapter 1 (1983); ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW, HOW 
TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 58–59 (2006); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, 
Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme 
Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2003). For the case of how Title 
VII has been judicially revised from an “anti-subordination” statute aiming to remedy historical 
oppression of racial minorities and women to a mere anti-classification scheme where any individual 
can be protected regardless of the historical realities of subordination, see David S. Schwartz, The 
Case of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and 
Racial Balancing, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 657, 657–59 (2000); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, 
Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 102 (2010); 
Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 409, 412 (2012). 
 13. PAUL DAVIES AND MARK FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND’S LABOUR AND THE LAW 12–13 (3d 
ed. 1983); see also Alan Bogg and Keith Ewing, A (Muted) Voice At Work? Collective Bargaining In 
The Supreme Court Of Canada, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 379, 412–13 (2012) (“In one of Otto 
Kahn-Freund’s final published works he explored the potentials and the pitfalls of constitutionalizing 
labor rights. One possible effect of constitutionalization was that judges ‘and not the democratically 
elected legislatures . . . have the power to determine fundamental political policies. The scope of social 
legislation is a political question.’ Ultimately, Kahn-Freund took the view that the United Kingdom 
should not ‘imitate the experiment of entrusting the legal profession with this vast amount of power.’” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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Moreover, the current pro-employer judicial hue in the U.S. over work 
law cases comes on the heels of legal scholarship calling for a rethinking 
of the “idea of labor law,”14 lamenting the demise of the standard 
employment contract,
15
 the upsurge in precarious jobs,
16
 and the all but 
complete collapse of private sector union membership.
17
 Work law, which 
seems perpetually destined to be on the defensive, has seen better days in 
the U.S.
18
 
While work law seems to be in decline in the U.S., Latin America 
appears to be playing a different tune.
19
 Seventy-five percent of developed 
 
 
 14. THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds. 2011). 
 15. RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT (Katherine V.W. Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 2013). See also DAVID WEIL, THE 
FISSURED WORKPLACE WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO 
IMPROVE IT (2014) (describing how the quality of American jobs has deteriorated for most job seekers, 
why this trend has occurred, and policy suggestions to resolve the problem). 
 16. See Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in 
Transition, 74 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 1 (2009). 
 17. Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low, 11.3%, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-
membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html?ref=stevengreenhouse&_r=0; For explanation of general 
downward trend, see Henry Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the 
Private Sector, 1973–1998, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 28 
(James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman, eds., 2002). 
 18. The high point, if not golden era of U.S. work law were the 1950s–1970s, when the 
combination of work law and powerful unions provided for “wage structures, benefits, and work rules 
that rewarded long-term employment,” the main goal of modern work law. Katherine V.W. Stone, The 
Decline of the Standard Contract of Employment in the United States: A Socio-Regulatory 
Perspective, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT, supra note 15, at 67. It was during this period that the standard contract of employment 
predominated in the U.S., or one characterized by “job security, longevity-based wages, employer-
based health insurance, and employment-linked retirement security.” Id. The same period, or about the 
second third of the twentieth century, were also the better eras of European and Latin American labor 
law. See Niklas Bruun & Bob Hepple, Economic Policy and Labour Law, in THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 15 COUNTRIES 1945–2004 45 (Bob Hepple 
& Bruno Veneziani eds., 2009) (discussing how the 1980s marked a retreat for work law in Europe as 
a result of global crisis and the advent of market-friendly alternatives, or neoliberalism); Graciela 
Besunsán, Labour Law in Latin America: The Gap Between Norms and Reality, in LABOUR LAW AND 
WORKER PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 137 (Tzehainesh Teklè, ed. 2010) (describing how 
Latin American countries enacted work law in the first half of the twentieth century but institutional 
supports for those laws, e.g., strong states, stable jobs for men without domestic responsibilities, strong 
unions, and wages protected from global competition unraveled in the 1980s as a result of the global 
crisis, dissolving much of the institutional base for effective work law in Latin America). 
 19. Graciela Besunsán, Legislation and Labor Policy In Latin America: Crisis, Renovation, or 
Restoration?, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 655 (2013) (Latin American work law provides for 
inclusive development, reduces poverty and inequality, and helped governments respond to the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009); César F. Rosado Marzán, No More Solitude? Workers’ Conditions and 
Rights In Latin America During The Great Recession, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 291 [hereinafter 
Rosado Marzán, No More Solitude?]; See also INT’L LABOUR ORG., WORLD OF WORK REPORT 2012: 
BETTER JOBS FOR A BETTER ECONOMY 39 (2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ 
public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_179453.pdf. 
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world economies relaxed labor protections during the economic crisis that 
ensued in 2008, whereas only half of Latin American countries did the 
same.
20
 Moreover, to the extent that Latin American countries have 
relaxed workplace regulations, such changes have been very mild.
21
 It is 
remarkable that Latin American countries have not massively relaxed 
labor protections because the region was a poster child for deregulation in 
1990s.
22
 Overall, the region has actually increased and strengthened labor 
protections since its return to democratic rule.
23
 It has also been able to 
add fifty million individuals to the middle class, improve employment, and 
reduce poverty and child mortality.
24
 
After decades of authoritarianism and neoliberal reform, scholars have 
had to revitalize legal principles.
25
 The revitalizing scholars swam with the 
current because Latin American civil law institutions generally use legal 
principles.
26
 In the civil law tradition, and contrary to common law 
 
 
 20. Rosado Marzán, No More Solitude?, supra note 19, at 296. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Tamara Lothian, The Democratized Market Economy in Latin America (And Elsewhere): An 
Exercise in Institutional Thinking Within Law and Political Economy, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 169, 
175–76 (1995) (describing neoliberalism in Latin America). On deregulation in Latin America and its 
explanations, see generally MARÍA LORENA COOK, THE POLITICS OF LABOR REFORM IN LATIN 
AMERICA, BETWEEN FLEXIBILITY AND RIGHTS (2008); MARÍA VICTORIA MURILLO, LABOR UNIONS, 
PARTISAN COALITIONS, AND MARKET REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA (2001). 
 23. On the current trend towards strengthening labor inspection systems in Latin America see 
Michael J. Piore & Andrew Schrank, Toward a Managed Flexibility: The Revival of Labour Inspection 
in the Latin World, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 1, 23–25 (2008); Andrew Schrank & Michael Piore, 
ECLAC/Mexico, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas: Norms, Regulations and Labor Standards in Central 
America at 43–47, U.N. Doc. 77, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.G.44 (2007) available at 
http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/28113/Serie%2077.pdf. For the case of Argentina, see 
Matthew Amengual, Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages with Society in 
Argentina, 67 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2014). For the case of Brazil, see Roberto Pires, 
Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance Outcomes in Brazil, 
147 INT’L LAB. REV. 199, 199–201 (2008). For the case of Chile, see César F. Rosado Marzán, Of 
Labor Inspectors and Judges: Chilean Labor Law Enforcement After Pinochet (And What the United 
States can do to Help), 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 497 (2010) [hereinafter Rosado Marzán, Of Labor 
Inspectors and Judges]; César F. Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law Compliance: Lessons 
from Chile, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 343 (2012) [hereinafter Rosado Marzán, Punishment and 
Work Law Compliance]. For the case of the Dominican Republic, see Andrew Schrank, 
Professionalization and Probity in the Patrimonial State: Labor Inspectors in the Dominican Republic, 
51 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y. 91, 91 (2009). 
 24. Rosado Marzán, No More Solitude?, supra note 19, at 293–96. 
 25. See José Luis Ugarte Cataldo, La Rehabilitación de los principios del derecho del trabajo y 
el concepto de derecho, 1 REV. DER. LABORAL Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 31 (2013) [hereinafter Ugarte 
Cataldo, La Rehabilitación de los principios del derecho del trabajo] (explaining the need to 
reconstruct work law by interpreting, filling gaps, and resolving conflicts of laws with guiding 
principles). 
 26. ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 288 (citing James F. Smith, Differences in the United 
States and Mexican Legal Systems in the Era of NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 88 (1993)). 
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systems where judges have more free rein to make law through 
interpretative, precedent-setting judgments, Latin American jurists must 
apply code provisions rather than interpret them.
27
 In “hard cases,” or 
cases where the normative premises to answer the legal questions are in 
controversy, or where it is impossible to deduce an answer to a legal 
question by deducing logically from the black letter rules,
28
 the Latin 
American jurist must reason from legal principles and consult legal 
scholarship.
29
 In the same manner that principles give judges a tool to 
decide cases where rules do not provide a clear answer, principles also 
restrain judges from steering away from the values and purposes of the 
law.
30
 
In Latin America, some scholars argue that principles guide judges by 
providing superior or parallel norms to the black letter rules.
31
 These 
superior or parallel norms contain the rules’ cohesive and substantive 
content.
32
 In this sense, principles act as the values and purposes of law.
33
 
Therefore, principles are law.
34
 Other scholars take a softer approach and 
argue that principles are the inspiration behind the law.
35
 Still other 
scholars of a more positivistic slant argue that principles are general and 
common ideas that surge from specific and authoritative legal texts.
36
 
Without resolving these philosophical disputes on the nature of legal 
principles, which is beyond the scope of this Article, the authors take a 
more modest perspective here by, first, describing the principles as 
enunciated by scholars, as they emerge from the countries’ constitutions 
and statutes, and then by explaining how such principles are used by South 
American judges to interpret and fill in the gaps to decide particular cases.  
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Ugarte Cataldo, La Rehabilitación de los principios del derecho del trabajo, supra note 25, at 
31, citing Neil MacCormick, La argumentación silogística: una defensa matizada, 30 DOXA 332 
(2007); see also Jorge Streeter Prieto, Casos Difíciles, 38 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES 197, 210–
11 (1993). Compare with RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978) (hard cases are 
those where a lawsuit cannot be brought under a particular rule of law). 
 29. ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 288 (citing James F. Smith, Differences in the 
United States and Mexican Legal Systems in the Era of NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 88 (1993)). 
 30. MARIO E. ACKERMAN, LOS PRINCIPIOS EN EL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO, TRATADO DE 
DERECHO DEL TRABAJO, TOMO I 323–24 (Mario E. Ackerman & Diego M. Tosca eds., 2005) (one of 
the functions of the protective principle is to limit the juridical, collective, judicial, administrative, and 
supranational, i.e., “technical,” means of implementing work law). 
 31. Ugarte Cataldo, La Rehabilitación de los principios del derecho del trabajo, supra note 25, at 
29. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 27–30. 
 35. Id. at 26. 
 36. Id. 
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Latin American work law incorporates the following important 
principles: (1) protection (over individual freedom of contract); 
(2) dominance of reality (over legal formalism); (3) non-waiver of rights; 
(4) employment stability, or continuity of the employment relationship 
(over precarious employment); and (5) labor union autonomy (over 
employer and/or government domination of unions).
37
  
For space limitations, here the authors only discuss the principle of 
protection, which the authors consider to be the pillar of Latin American 
work law, particularly in Argentina,
38
 Brazil,
39
 Chile,
40
 and Uruguay.
41
  
But the authors do not stop in Latin America. They argue that a Latin 
American labor jurist would find the principle of protection in U.S. legal 
scholarship, in the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the 
black letter rules, and in the legislative purposes. U.S. work law protects 
workers. In fact, Latin American jurists would recognize something akin 
to the rule of in dubio pro operario, a Latin American canon of statutory 
interpretation that posits that hard cases must be resolved in favor of 
workers, in the Anglo-American legal maxim that states that remedial 
statutes must be interpreted liberally. The authors argue, however, that 
work law requires perhaps an even more “liberal” interpretation of the law 
than suggested by the legal maxim given the values and purposes of work 
law to guard the human dignity of the most vulnerable people, values of 
the highest order in the American republic, as Justice Warren once 
proclaimed.
42
 
This Article, therefore, has two goals. The first is simply descriptive: to 
detail as faithfully as possible, and in a comprehensible manner, the 
principle of protection in Latin American work law. There is no scholarly 
 
 
 37. South American work law scholars have recognized various principles, sometimes up to ten 
of them. See ALBERTO J. RUPRECHT, LOS PRINCIPIOS FORMATIVOS LABORALES Y SU PROYECCIÓN EN 
LA LEGISLACIÓN 7 (1992). Even though scholars have not agreed on the total number and types of 
principles, there is significant consensus regarding the five principles enumerated in this Article. See 
AMÉRICO PLÁ RODRÍGUEZ, LOS PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 13 (3d ed. 1998); SERGIO 
GAMONAL C., FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO LABORAL 104–15 (2008) [hereinafter GAMONAL C., 
FUNDAMENTOS]; SERGIO GAMONAL C., INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 132–48 (1998) 
[hereinafter GAMONAL C., INTROCCIÓN AL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO]. 
 38. MARIO E. ACKERMAN, LOS PRINCIPIOS EN EL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO, TRATADO DE 
DERECHO DEL TRABAJO, TOMO I 307 (Mario E. Ackerman & Diego M. Tosca eds., 2005). 
 39. AMAURI MASCARO NASCIMENTO, INICIAÇÂO AO DIREITO DO TRABALHO 118–19 (23d ed. 
1997). 
 40. GAMONAL C., FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 37, at 104. 
 41. PLÁ RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 37, at 61. 
 42. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 433 (the constitution aspires social justice, brotherhood, and 
human dignity, goals that brought the U.S. into being); see also Bruce Ackerman, Dignity is a 
Constitutional Principle, THE N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/dignity-is-a-constitutional-principle.html?hp&rref=opinion&_r=1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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work, to the authors’ knowledge, which has attempted to explain Latin 
American work law principles to an international, English-speaking 
audience.
43
 As Latin America plays a more central role in international 
trade and foreign relations, learning more about its law, including work 
law and its principles, matters for global lawyers.
44
 
The authors’ second goal is to consider U.S. work law from a Latin 
American perspective. In this manner, the authors reinterpret one of the 
developed world’s allegedly least protective work law regimes, in a 
manner that supports the protection of weak parties, and more specifically, 
workers.
45
  
This Article is divided into six parts. Part I is this introduction. Part II 
describes the Latin American principle of protection in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay. Part III describes the rule of in dubio pro operario 
which follows from the principle of protection. Part IV describes how a 
Latin American labor judge would find the protective principle in the U.S. 
In Part V, the authors contest two arguments for why U.S. work law would 
not support a protective principle: first, the employment-at-will doctrine 
weakens work law; and second, the notion that remedial statutes, such as 
work law statutes, deserve a more “liberal” interpretation has been 
rendered superfluous or incoherent by important American jurists. Part VI 
is the conclusion of the Article.  
 
 
 43. However, the current global crisis seems to be forcing a reawakening of work law principles, 
which then surface in English-language publications. See Inmaculada Baviera, Employment Stability in 
Spanish Labor Law: Between Regulatory Tradition and Social Reality, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
677 (2013) (explaining how current Spanish labor policy is at odds with the traditional work law 
principle of employment stability). Also, at least one major English Language treatise names the 
principles of work law in Argentina. WILLIAM L. KELLER & TIMOTHY J. DARBY, IIB INT’L LAB. & 
EMPL. LAWS 76-4 (4th ed. 2012) (citing Law 20,744, as amended (Arg.)). For a discussion of how 
some countries and scholars may recognize a different number of principles than others. See 
GAMONAL C., FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 37, at 104–15; GAMONAL C., INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO 
DEL TRABAJO, supra note 37, at 132–48. 
 44. Brazil, Argentina and Chile are among the world’s top 30 net exporting countries, making 
them global leaders in international trade. List of countries by net exports, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_net_exports (last visited Jan 28, 2014) (citing The 
World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/). 
 45. See THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WERE YOU BORN ON THE WRONG CONTINENT?: HOW THE 
EUROPEAN MODEL CAN HELP YOU GET A LIFE (2011) (explaining how Western European countries 
generally provide better quality jobs, pensions, free or inexpensive college, child care, and parental 
care than the U.S. as a matter of law and policy); JONAS PONTUSSON, INEQUALITY AND PROSPERITY: 
SOCIAL EUROPE VS. LIBERAL AMERICA 26 (2005) (describing how social Europe outpaces liberal U.S. 
on labor market regulatory measures such as union density, coverage of collective bargaining 
agreements, social spending, and social protection). 
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I. THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE 
In the words of Uruguayan work law scholar, Professor Oscar Ermida, 
protection is work law’s raison d’être.46 Professor Ermida professed such 
words because Latin American work law starts with the claim that power 
underpins all social relations, particularly employment relations where 
workers are subordinated to the employer and are dependent on it.
47
 If 
society leaves workers subject to individual freedom of contract and the 
market, workers’ labor is turned into a commodity. Latin American work 
law understands that when labor is treated as a commodity, workers’ 
subsistence and moral interests are compromised. The law must restore the 
power imbalance in employment relations to safeguard workers’—and 
society’s—moral interests.48  
In this section, the authors illustrate how the protective principle of 
work law manifests in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The authors 
chose these countries due to their importance in Latin America. While 
Brazil and Argentina are two of the three largest Latin American 
 
 
 46. Oscar Ermida Uriarte, Protección, Igualdad, Dignidad, Libertad y No Discriminación, 15 
CADERNOS DE AMATRA IV 11 (2011). 
 47. For Argentinian scholars, see ADRIÁN GOLDIN & ALIMENTI J., CURSO DE DERECHO DEL 
TRABAJO Y DE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 3 (2009). For Brazilian scholars, see MAURICIO GODINHO 
DELGADO, PRINCÍPIOS DE DIREITO INDIVIDUAL E COLETIVO DO TRABALHO 33 (2d ed. 2004) and JOSÉ 
MARTINS CATHARINO, DIREITO DO TRABALHO 12 (2d ed. 1976). For Chilean scholars, see SERGIO 
GAMONAL C., FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 37, at 4 and JOSÉ LUIS UGARTE C., LA SUBORDINACIÓN EN 
EL DERECHO LABORAL CHILENO 1–9 (2008). For Uruguayan scholars, see PLÁ RODRÍGUEZ, supra 
note 37, at 63, MARIO GARMENDIA ARIGÓN, ORDEN PÚBLICO Y DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 68 (2001), and 
Oscar Ermida Uriarte, Crítica de la Libertad Sindical, 242 REVISTA DERECHO LABORAL 226 (2011). 
 South American work law scholars will regularly cite comparative sources to buttress their 
arguments. On the particular point of worker subordination and the need for work law they commonly 
cite OTTO KAHN-FREUND, TRABAJO Y DERECHO 48, 133 (1987) (German-Briton scholar who argued 
that work law serves as a counterweight to employer power in the employment relationship), MANUEL 
CAMPOS PALOMEQUE, EL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO E IDEOLOGIA 17 (1985) (Spanish work law scholar 
who argued that work law stabilizes the employer-worker relationship), Bruno Veneziani, Tre 
Commenti alla Critique du Droit du Travail de Supiot, 67 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI 
RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI 3 (1995) (Italian work law scholar describes the subordination of the worker 
to the employer and argues for the need to protect), ALAIN SUPIOT, CRÍTICA DEL DERECHO DEL 
TRABAJO 133–34 (Ministerio del Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales de España 1996) (French work law 
scholar who argued that in employment relations the employer commands the worker and the worker 
must obey, raising the need for a protective work law), among many others. 
 48. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 46, at 11. Note, however, that South American work law also 
cognizes that work law principles are the product of a political compromise at the legislative level and 
are not absolute. Work law presumes that the employer must remain economically viable if the worker 
is to keep a job. In this regard, work law also safeguards employers’ rights in addition to protecting the 
worker. The protective principle contains an implicit presumption of flexible protection of the worker. 
On this point, South American work law scholars cite French professor Gérard Lyon-Caen, LE DROIT 
DU TRAVAIL, UNE TECHNIQUE RÉVERSIBLE 6 (1995). 
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economies,
49
 Uruguay and Chile are the best economically performing 
economies in the region.
50
  
A. Argentina
51
 
The protective principle in Argentina stems from the Constitution, 
which provides that work, or labor, shall be protected.
52
 It provides 
specific workers’ rights, including individual and collective rights, and 
rights pertaining to social security.
53
 The list of enumerated rights in the 
Constitution is so extensive that it is better to look at its text. It states: 
Labor in its several forms shall be protected by law, which shall 
ensure to workers: dignified and equitable working conditions; 
limited working hours; paid rest and vacations; fair remuneration; 
minimum vital and adjustable wage; equal pay for equal work; 
participation in the profits of enterprises, with control of production 
and collaboration in the management; protection against arbitrary 
dismissal; stability of the civil servant; free and democratic labor 
union organizations recognized by the mere registration in a special 
record. 
Trade unions are hereby guaranteed: the right to enter into 
collective labor bargains; to resort to conciliation and arbitration; 
the right to strike. Union representatives shall have the guarantees 
necessary for carrying out their union tasks and those related to the 
stability of their employment.  
The State shall grant the benefits of social security, which shall be 
of an integral nature and may not be waived. In particular, the laws 
shall establish: compulsory social insurance, which shall be in 
charge of national or provincial entities with financial and economic 
autonomy, administered by the interested parties with State 
participation, with no overlapping of contributions; adjustable 
 
 
 49. World Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2012, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/ 
GDP.pdf (last visited July 2, 2013). 
 50. For the case of Chile, see SEBASTIÁN EDWARDS, LEFT BEHIND: LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
FALSE PROMISE OF POPULISM 101–21 (2010). For Uruguay, see International Finance Corporation and 
World Bank, Doing Business, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/uruguay/ (last 
visited July 2, 2013). 
 51. This section benefitted from the review of Argentinean Professor Juan Pablo Mugnolo. 
 52. Sec.14bis, [Const. Nac.] (Arg). (official translation), available at http://www.biblioteca.jus. 
gov.ar/Argentina-Constitution.pdf (last visited on Mar. 22, 2014). 
 53. Id. 
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retirements and pensions; full family protection; protection of 
homestead; family allowances and access to a worthy housing.
54
 
Therefore, given the general statement that work must be protected, and 
the detailed list of individual, collective and social security rights granted 
by the Constitution of the Republic of Argentina, legal scholars have 
stated that Argentina explicitly recognizes the principle of protection.
55
 
The protective principle is also explicitly stated in the work law statute. 
The Employment Contract Law specifically mentions the protective 
principle.
56
 It includes the requirement to rule in favor of the employee 
when the rules are inconclusive or when there is a conflict of normative 
sources to apply to a case.
57
 
Argentinean courts readily invoke the protective principle when 
deciding hard cases. For example, an Argentinean appellate court held that 
university medical professionals could not be excluded from the legal 
regulations of the employment contract even if the law did not explicitly 
include them as covered employees.
58
 According to the court, such 
exclusions would violate the protective principle. Therefore, the court 
 
 
 54. Id. The original Spanish reads:  
 El trabajo en sus diversas formas gozará de la protección de las leyes, las que asegurarán 
al trabajador: condiciones dignas y equitativas de labor; jornada limitada; descanso y 
vacaciones pagados; retribución justa; salario mínimo vital móvil; igual remuneración por 
igual tarea; participación en las ganancias de las empresas, con control de la producción y 
colaboración en la dirección; protección contra el despido arbitrario; estabilidad del empleado 
público; organización sindical libre y democrática, reconocida por la simple inscripción en un 
registro especial. 
 Queda garantizado a los gremios: concertar convenios colectivos de trabajo; recurrir a la 
conciliación y al arbitraje; el derecho de huelga. Los representantes gremiales gozarán de las 
garantías necesarias para el cumplimiento de su gestión sindical y las relacionadas con la 
estabilidad de su empleo. 
 El Estado otorgará los beneficios de la seguridad social, que tendrá carácter de integral e 
irrenunciable. En especial, la ley establecerá: el seguro social obligatorio, que estará a cargo 
de entidades nacionales o provinciales con autonomía financiera y económica, administradas 
por los interesados con participación del Estado, sin que pueda existir superposición de 
aportes; jubilaciones y pensiones móviles; la protección integral de la familia; la defensa del 
bien de familia; la compensación económica familiar y el acceso a una vivienda digna. 
Sec.14 bis, [Const. Nac.] (Arg). available at http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/ 
congreso/Constitucion%20sola.pdf. 
 55. The Supreme Court of Argentina readily invokes the protective principle. See infra note 61. 
 56. KELLER & DARBY, supra note 43, at 76-4 (citing Law 20.744, as amended (Arg.)). 
 57. Id.  
 58. MARÍA DEL CARMEN PIÑA, LA CONDICIÓN LABORAL Y EL PRINCIPIO PROTECTORIO 201–02 
(2007) (citing Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, Sala 1 [National Chamber for Labor 
Appeals, Room 1], 02/28/1989, Susana Sassi E.C. / Sadaic, (Arg)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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declared that the country’s work laws covered the university medical 
professionals.
59
 
In a different case, a labor court, facing contradictory laws and 
normative sources, decided to choose the result most favorable to the 
worker, noting that “the most favorable outcome should be adopted based 
on the principle of protection. . . .”60  
The protective principle has even been used to declare aspects of 
statutory law unconstitutional. For example, in Aníbal c/ Disco, S.A.,
61
 the 
Supreme Court of Argentina declared article 103 bis (c) of the 
Employment Contract Law
62
 unconstitutional for excluding as legal 
compensation any food stamps provided by the employer to the employee 
as consideration for work.
63
 The challenged law considered food stamps 
“social benefits that are not compensation, not fungible, which cannot be 
accrued or substituted by money.”64 Because the text of the law made it 
clear that food stamps were not compensation, the employees could not 
include the food stamps’ value into a back-pay award.65 The law raised a 
constitutional issue because it regulated employees’ pay, which is 
constitutionally protected. Based on the protective principle, which is also 
of constitutional character in Argentina, the Court declared Argentina Law 
24.700 of 1996, excluding as compensation any food stamps provided by 
employers as consideration for work, unconstitutional. The ruling allowed 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 207 (original translation by authors), citing Tribunal del Trabajo No. 3 de Lomas de 
Zamora [Labor Court No. 3 of Lomas de Zamora], 11/3/1991, Pedro Benítez C. C. / Hidroconst S.A. 
(Arg.). The original reference in Spanish reads: Las veces que la ley de contrato de trabajo . . . trae 
normas de colisión entre fuentes, debe adoptarse el principio de régimen más favorable con 
fundamento en el principio protectorio del derecho individual del trabajo, por lo que la aplicación del 
régimen más favorable se impone como función integradora de los principios generales de derecho del 
trabajo. Id. 
 61. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
1/9/2009, “Pérez, Aníbal Raúl c/ Disco S.A.” (on file with autor).  
 62. According to the text at the time the cause of action was filed by the plaintiff, per Law 
24.700 of 1996. Article 103 bis (c) stated: 
[s]e denominan beneficios sociales a las prestaciones de naturaleza jurídica de seguridad 
social, no remunerativas, no dineradas, no acumulables ni sustituibles en dinero, que brinda el 
empleador al trabajador por sí o por medio de terceros, que tiene como objeto mejorar la 
calidad de vida del dependiente o de su familia a cargo. Son beneficios sociales las siguientes 
prestaciones: [. . .] c) Los vales alimentarios [. . .] otorgados a través de empresas habilitadas 
por la autoridad de aplicación. . . . 
Id. ¶ 2, citing Law No. 24.700 (1996). 
 63. Pérez, Aníbal Raúl c/ Disco S.A. ¶ 9. 
 64. Id. ¶ 9. 
 65. Id. ¶ 1. 
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employees to request the value of food stamps not provided by the 
employer as back-pay.
66
 
To summarize, Argentina recognizes the protective principle. Scholars 
and judges derive the principle from the country’s Constitution and 
statutes.
67
  
B. Brazil
68
 
Brazil’s Constitution, like Argentina’s, contains a detailed and 
exhaustive list of labor and social security rights.
69
 Brazilian Professor 
 
 
 66. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 67. The protective principle is considered by Argentinean courts even when workers lose cases. 
For example, in Murillo with Compibal S.R.L., the Supreme Court of Argentina granted a petition by a 
corporation, a pharmaceutical company [hereinafter referred to as “principal”] that had contracted with 
a third party to provide meals to the principal’s employees (hereinafter referred to as “contractor”). 
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 9/30/2008, 
“Hector Octavio Murillo c/ Compival S.R.L. y otro / recurso de hecho,” available at 
http://www.csjin.gov.ar (Arg.). The Supreme Court reversed a decision by the intermediate (appellate) 
court declaring that the principal was jointly liable to the employees of the contractor. The Supreme 
Court stated that joint liability was triggered only when the principal contracted for functions that were 
normal, specific, and inherent to the productive process of the principal. In this case, the employer was 
a producer of pharmaceuticals. It had contracted with a third party to provide meals to the employees 
making the pharmaceuticals. Meal preparation was, according to the employer and the Supreme Court 
of Argentina, not normal, specific, and inherent to the production process of the principal. Therefore, 
the food service workers could not hold the principal liable for the debts arising out of their 
employment contract with the contractor. 
 In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Argentina considered that the Court should 
protect workers but only when the facts so justify it. The Court stated: 
[T]he foundation of art. 30 of the Law of Employment Contracts [“Ley de Contrato de 
Trabajo”] is the protective principle of the rights of the worker, which the National 
Constitution prescribes and has been applied repeatedly by this Court (Decisions: 315: 1059, 
126; 319: 3040; 327: 3677, 3753, 4607, among many others). The protection referred to is 
made concrete, in this case, by a legal rule that establishes [joint liability] with the goal of 
broadening the dependent’s [the worker’s] credit guarantee. (Emphasis added).  
The Court recognized the important, Constitutional duty to protect the worker by giving him or her 
special rights to seek relief from principals who contract with his or her direct employer. However, 
protection was not justified because the services rendered by the complaining employees were not 
normal, specific, and inherent to what the principal produced, but the protective principle nevertheless 
had to be assessed. In other words, the Court felt compelled to address the protective principle even 
when, or perhaps even especially because, it was going to hold against the workers in that particular 
case. In our view, the Court had to make it clear that it was not violating the protective principle. See 
Id.. 
 68. This section benefitted from the review of Brazilian Professor and labor judge Henrique M. 
Hinz. 
 69. The Constitution enumerates a number of rights:  
 protections against arbitrary dismissal without just cause; 
 unemployment insurance; 
 minimum wage; 
 worker participation in company profits; 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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Mauricio Godinho has thus stated that principle of protection exists in 
Brazil; as he has stated, “[t]he principles and rules that protect the person 
and her labor constitutes a structural part of the Constitution of the 
Brazilian Republic. Wisely, the Constitution realized that esteeming work 
is one of the most important conduits for respecting the human being.”70 
As in Argentina, the principle of protection has a constitutional foundation 
in Brazil.
71
 
The Superior Labour Court of Brazil, the highest court in Brazil with 
competence over work law cases, normally applies the principle of 
protection when facing hard cases. For example, in one case, an employee 
filed a complaint against an employer who failed to pay the employee her 
accrued vacation time after the employment contract was terminated.
72
 
The law stated that holidays needed to be “enjoyed” by the workers.73 The 
law was silent as to whether employers had to pay holiday time accrued 
but not enjoyed by the worker when the parties terminated the contract.
74
 
The Court held that the employer was required to compensate the worker 
for his or her vacation time, regardless of the law’s silence or ambiguity 
concerning holiday pay.
75
 The Court noted that the law was “established 
 
 
 a regular working day not exceeding eight hours and forty-four hours weekly; 
 paid weekly rest, preferably on Sundays; 
 overtime pay of at least fifty percent of normal pay;  
 paid vacations; 
 paid maternity leave; 
 paternity leave; 
 prohibitions against discrimination at work; 
 the prohibition of night, hazardous or unhealthy work for children under eighteen 
and any work to under fourteen, except as an apprentice. 
Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 7 (Braz.). 
 70. The original Portuguese text states:  
Os princípios e regras de proteção á pessoa humana e ao trabalho constituem parte estrutural 
da Constituição da República brasileira. Sabiamente, a Carta Magna percebeu que a 
valorização do trabalho é um dos mais relevantes veículos de valorização do próprio ser 
humano[.] 
GODINHO DELGADO, supra note 47, at 32. 
 71. Brazilian scholarship has also highlighted how “the protective principle that guides and 
justifies the existence of labor law as a specialized branch of law is necessary to place the principle of 
human dignity in the field of labor relations.” See Valdete Severo, A Força de um Paradigma e a 
Interpretação dos Artigos 60 e 62 da CLT, 2 CADERNOS DA AMATRA IV 11 (2007). 
 72. ARION SAYAO ROMITA, DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS NAS RELAÇOES DE TRABALHO 373–74 
(2005) citing Proc. No. 55.55396/92.4 E RR, 11.06.1995 (Braz.). 
 73. Id. See also Brazil Consolidated Labor Laws art. 129, which states: “Todo empregado terá 
direito anualmente ao gozo de um período de férias, sem prejuízo da remuneração”. C.L.T. arts. 129–
152 (Braz.). 
 74. SAYAO ROMITA, supra note 72, at 373–74. 
 75. Id. 
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with the objective of protecting the health of workers, and it would be 
inconsistent if the legislator allowed situations where no one could benefit 
from them. Based on this premise, the judge must address situations where 
the enjoyment of the holiday is materially impossible, which could happen 
when the employment contract becomes extinct. Under these assumptions, 
we ought to apply the legal maxim that says: ‘[t]he judge must serve the 
social goals and the common good pursued in the application of the law.’76 
Hence, the Court decided that the worker’s accrued vacation time had to 
be paid, based on the principle of protection, regardless of whether the law 
was silent on the particular issue. 
The above-stated case is one of many. One can find thousands of 
results when searching the phrase “principio da proteção” (principle of 
protection) on the search engine of the Superior Labor Court of Brazil.
77
 
To summarize, Brazil, like Argentina, recognizes the protective 
principle of work law in its constitution, jurisprudence, and case law. 
C. Chile 
Chile has also recognized a principle of protection that, as in Argentina 
and Brazil, stems from the country’s Constitution, even though the 
Chilean Constitution does not have the type of highly detailed social rights 
that Argentina and Brazil have. The 1980 Chilean Constitution simply 
states: “Freedom to work and its protection. Everyone has the right to self-
 
 
 76. Id. at 373, citing Proc. No. 55.55396/92.4 E RR, 11.06.1995 (Braz.) (emphasis added). The 
original Portuguese text reads: 
Assim, instituída com o objetivo de proteger a saúde do trabalhador, seria um contra-senso o 
propio legislador normalizar possibilidades em que tal gozo não ocorresse. Amparado nessa 
premissa, compete ao intérprete solucionar as situacionais em que o gozo das férias não 
pode ser fixado por impossibilidade material, mormente quando já extinto o contrato do 
trabalho. E, nessas hipóteses, há de imperar a máxima de hermenêutica, que prediz: “Na 
aplicação da lei, o juiz atenderá aos fins sociais a que ela se dirige e ás exigências do bem 
comum.” 
 77. See, e.g., José Carlos Vaz Da Silva Filho, and Atento Brasil S.A., Vivo S.A., TST -RR 
161600-17.2008.5.18.0004 (T.S.T.) (Braz.) (the rule of the most favorable norm stems from the 
protective principle of work law contained in Brazil’s constitution); Viação Santa Brígida Ltda., and 
Egberto Gonçalves De Lima, Central Sistema De Limpeza Ltda., Cimplast Embalagens—Importação, 
Exportação e Comércio Ltda, TST-AIRR 217940-63.2004.5.02.0069 (T.S.T.) (Braz.) (based on the 
principle of protection, a principal was jointly liable with its contractor towards the employees of its 
contractor when the principal was negligent in supervising the contractor); In re Banco Nossa Caixa, 
TST-RR 93800-25.2005.5.15.0015 (T.S.T) (Braz.) (rejecting motion to dismiss filed by employer on 
the grounds that the pleading requirements for workers filing suit in the labor courts are less rigorous 
than in ordinary civil trials, given the work law and the need to equalize power relations between 
employers and workers). See also Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, http://www.tst.jus.br/consulta-
unificada (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
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employment and free choice of employment with just remuneration.”78 
Interpreting those parsimonious words, the Chilean Constitutional Court 
has noted:  
Indeed, the constitutional protection . . . is not limited to 
guarantee[ing] freedom of choice and hiring, but . . . [is a] 
protection of work itself, in response to the inalienable commitment 
to respect the worker in the manner in which he or she performs his 
or her labor and the inescapable social role that work provides.
79
  
Legal scholars have also supported this broad construction of the 
constitution’s labor protections.80  
The Chilean labor judges use the protective principle regularly to 
interpret the law.
81
 For example, in the case Opazo con Lan-Chile,
82
 a 
worker sued for severance pay,
83
 in lieu of the statutorily mandated 30-day 
termination notice,
84
 and for other penalties. The employer argued that it 
was not liable for the penalties because, according to the employer’s 
interpretation of the labor code, the penalties applied only when the parties 
agreed to make payments in installments and not when they were owed in 
their entirety. On the other hand, the Labor Code stated, in relevant part, 
that when the employer terminates the employee for allegedly breaching 
 
 
 78. CONSTITUCIÓN [CONSITUTION] POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19 ¶ 1–2. 
 79. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 26 julio 2011 Rol de la causa:1852-10 
(Chile), citing Luz Bulnes, La libertad de trabajo y su protección en la Constitución de 1980, 28 
REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO U. CHILE 207, 215 (1980) and JOSÉ LUIS CEA, DERECHO 
CONSTITUCIONAL CHILENO, TOMO II 427 (2004). 
 80. Bulnes, supra note 79, at 209–10; HUMBERTO NOGUEIRA ALCALÁ ET AL., DERECHO 
CONSTITUCIONAL TOMO I 281 (1994); GUIDO MACCHIAVELLO CONTRERAS, DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 
36 (1986); ALEJANDRO SILVA BASCUÑÁN & MARÍA PÍA SILVA GALLINATO, TRATADO DE DERECHO 
CONSTITUCIONAL TOMO 13, 222 (Tomo 13 2010); ALAN BRONFMAN VARGAS ET AL., CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA COMENTADA, 336 (2012); PEDRO IRURETA URIARTE, CONSTITUCIÓN Y ORDEN PÚBLICO 
LABORAL: UN ANÁLISIS DEL ART. 19 NO. 16 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN CHILENA, 52–57 (2006); SERGIO 
GAMONAL C., INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO, supra note 37, at 53. 
 81. However, between 2003 and 2014 the Chilean Supreme Court’s 4th Chamber, where labor 
cases and controversies are normally referred to, was less protective than other chambers and courts of 
the country. See infra note 89. 
 82. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court] Rol de la causa: 5058-03, cited in 
SERGIO GAMONAL C., LINEAMIENTOS DE DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 15 (2006) [hereinafter GAMONAL 
C., LINEAMIENTOS]. 
 83. Once an employment contract is terminated for economic reasons (employer needs), Chilean 
law provides that the employer must pay the worker severance based on time of employment, which is 
approximately one month’s salary per year of employment, limited to a total of eleven years. CÓDIGO 
DEL TRABAJO [CÓD. TRAB.] [LABOR CODE] art. 163.  
 84. Employers must also give 30 days advance notice before terminating an employee for 
economic reasons. Otherwise, the worker must be paid an indemnity substituting for prior notice, equal 
to one month’s salary. CÓDIGO DEL TRABAJO [CÓD. TRAB.] [LABOR CODE] art. 162. 
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his or her duties, or for disciplinary reasons, and the employer fails to 
prove its case, and then: 
The termination notice [becomes] . . . an irrevocable offer to pay 
compensation for years of service . . . . The employer is obligated to 
pay the compensation referred to in the preceding paragraph in a 
lump sum. . . .  
 Without prejudice to the foregoing paragraph, the parties may 
agree to make payments in installments, in which case the amounts 
owed shall include interest and adjustments. The settlement 
agreement must be ratified by the Labor Inspectorate. Breach of the 
settlement will accelerate payment of the total debt and shall be 
punished with an administrative fine. 
 If such compensation is not to be payable to the employee, the 
employee may request enforcement proceedings to the appropriate 
court . . . and the judge . . . may increase the amounts owed by up to 
150% . . .
85
 
Because the paragraph providing for the 150% penalty was placed by the 
legislature after the paragraph regarding installment payments, the 
employer argued that the 150% increase applied only when the parties had 
agreed on a payment plan.
86
 The Chilean Labor Court and the Court of 
Appeals disagreed with the employer and held in favor of the worker.
87
 
Even in the absence of a payment plan the employer could still be 
 
 
 85. CÓDIGO DEL TRABAJO [CÓD. TRAB.] [LABOR CODE] art. 169(a) (translation by authors). 
 The Spanish, unedited original reads: 
La comunicación que el empleador dirija al trabajador de acuerdo al inciso cuarto del artículo 
162, supondrá una oferta irrevocable de pago de la indemnización por años de servicios y de 
la sustitutiva de aviso previo, en caso de que éste no se haya dado, previstas en los artículos 
162, inciso cuarto, y 163, incisos primero o segundo, según corresponda. 
 El empleador estará obligado a pagar las indemnizaciones a que se refiere el inciso 
anterior en un solo acto al momento de extender el finiquito.  
 Sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso anterior, las partes podrán acordar el 
fraccionamiento del pago de las indemnizaciones; en este caso, las cuotas deberán consignar 
los intereses y reajustes del período. Dicho pacto deberá ser ratificado ante la Inspección del 
Trabajo. El simple incumplimiento del pacto hará inmediatamente exigible el total de la 
deuda y será sancionado con multa administrativa. 
 Si tales indemnizaciones no se pagaren al trabajador, éste podrá recurrir al tribunal que 
corresponda, para que en procedimiento ejecutivo se cumpla dicho pago, pudiendo el juez en 
este caso incrementarlas hasta en un 150%. . . . 
Id. 
 86. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court] Rol de la causa: 5058-03, cited in 
GAMONAL C., LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 8, at 15. 
 87. Id. 
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penalized with 150% of the total money owed to the worker, as argued by 
the Chilean Supreme Court:  
[T]here is no reason to conclude that the increase of 150% . . . 
applies only if the parties agree on installment payments. . . . [T]he 
legislature made no distinction as to whether these were indemnities 
that the employer had to pay in one lump sum . . . or [in 
installments]. Therefore, it is necessary to conclude that the sanction 
for failure to pay the indemnities offered refers to both situations. 
This criterion is corroborated if one also takes into account that the 
objective of the rule is none other than to establish a minimum 
mechanism of protection of the worker. Accordingly, considering 
the protective principle that inspires work law, there is no legal 
reason to discriminate between two cases that are both harmful to 
the worker.
88
 
Hence, the Supreme Court of Chile used the principle of protection to 
buttress its construction of the Labor Code.
89
 The protective principle is 
recognized in Chile, as we saw in Argentina and Brazil. 
 
 
 88. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court] Rol de la causa: 5058-03, cited in 
GAMONAL C., LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 82, at 20 (emphasis added).  
 The non-edited Spanish original reads: 
Que a diferencia de lo afirmado por el recurrente, no existe justificación para concluir que el 
incremento de hasta el 150% del monto de las indemnizaciones ofrecidas, se aplique sólo si 
las partes acordaron un plazo para su pago. En efecto, la norma transcrita se consigna al final 
de la letra a) del citado precepto y el legislador no distinguió si se trataba de aquellas 
indemnizaciones que el empleador debía pagar en un solo acto al momento de extenderse el 
finiquito o en los términos del pacto que celebren las partes al efecto, por ello forzoso es 
concluir, que la sanción por el no pago de las indemnizaciones ofrecidas se refiere a ambas 
situaciones. Este criterio se corrobora si se tiene presente, además, que el objetivo de la regla 
no es otro que establecer un mecanismo mínimo de resguardo para el trabajador. Por 
consiguiente, considerando el principio protector que inspira el derecho del trabajo, no existe 
razón jurídica para discriminar entre dos hipótesis que igualmente perjudican al dependiente. 
Id. 
 89. In recent years (2003–2014) the Fourth Chamber of the Chilean Supreme Court, which has 
the administrative duty of handling most work law cases and controversies, has adopted a stance less 
protective of workers. This less protective stance, unlike the one taken by the Constitutional Court, has 
been heavily criticized by scholars. See Eduardo Caamaño, Otra vuelta de tuerca a la Jurisprudencia 
de la Corte Suprema sobre la Doctrina de los Actos Propios en materia laboral, 4 ESTUDIOS 
LABORALES 34 (2009); José Luis Ugarte, La Corte Suprema y el Derecho de Huelga: Aquí no, por 
favor, 4 ESTUDIOS LABORALES 89 (2009); Sergio Gamonal C., La Jurisprudencia Laboral de la Corte 
Suprema: Un análisis crítico, 4 ESTUDIOS LABORALES 97 (2009). Since March of 2014, however, the 
members of the Fourth Chamber were replaced with different members. A legal blog shows that over 
twenty-six Fourth Chamber –the “New Labor Chamber” (“Nueva Sala Laboral”)—decisions are 
clearly based on the protective principle. See Sergio Gamonal C., Glosa Laboral, 
http://www.glosalaboral.cl/?page_id=206 (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).  
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D. Uruguay
90
 
Uruguay also recognizes the protective principle as part of its 
constitutional ordering, as provided by Article 53 of the Uruguayan 
Constitution:  
Work is under the special protection of the law. Every inhabitant of 
the Republic, without prejudice to their freedom, has a duty to apply 
their intellectual or physical energy in a way that benefits the 
community, which will seek to offer, giving preference to citizens, 
the ability to earn a livelihood through the development of an 
economic activity.
91
 
The Uruguayan Constitution recognizes that work is protected. The 
Uruguayan courts, similar to the other countries’ courts discussed, have 
extended work protections beyond a mere recognition of individual 
freedom of contract. As the Labor Court of Appeals has stated:  
When in doubt, the judge should keep with the general principles of 
work law . . . and take into consideration the special protective 
principle, this last one which is the fundamental backbone of work 
law, which aims to restore balance to the unequal relationship 
between employer and employee.
92
 
The Uruguayan labor courts are clear about their adherence to principles to 
resolve legal controversies, particularly the “special protective principle,” 
considered to be the backbone of work law. 
 
 
 Other chambers of the Supreme Court (civil, criminal and constitutional) apply the principle of 
protection when work law cases and controversies land there. Sergio Gamonal C., El daño moral por 
término del contrato de Trabajo, 1 REVISTA DE DERECHO LABORAL Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 124 (2013). 
 90. This section has benefitted from the comments of Uruguayan law professor Patricia Spiwak. 
 91. Uruguay Constitution, Art. 53. The Spanish original text states: 
El trabajo está bajo la protección especial de la ley. Todo habitante de la República, sin 
perjuicio de su libertad, tiene el deber de aplicar sus energías intelectuales o corporales en la 
forma que redunde en beneficio de la colectividad, la que procurará ofrecer con preferencia a 
los ciudadanos, la posibilidad de ganar su sustento mediante desarrollo de una actividad 
económica. 
Id. 
 92. The Spanish original source reads: 
[E]n caso de duda, tal decisión llevará al Juez a acudir a los principios generales del derecho 
del trabajo . . . y tener en especial consideración el principio protector que constituye el pilar 
fundamental del derecho laboral, cuya finalidad es restablecer el equilibrio en la desigual 
relación entre patrono y trabajador.  
PLÁ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 37, at 89 (citing Anuario de Jurisprudencia Laboral, Caso 481 (1984–
1985)).  
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Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Montevideo has used the principle 
of protection to decide hard cases. It recently held that a company that 
hired a contractor, which in turn hired its own employees, could be found 
liable for the debts of the contractor towards its employees; the principal 
who hired the contractor could be considered a so-called “complex 
employer” even if the positive law did not mention a “complex employer” 
or that principals could be liable for the debts of their agents towards the 
agents’ employees.93 The facts showed that a principal had hired 
contractors. Those contractors owed wages to their workers, so the 
workers sued the contractors and the principal for nonpayment of wages. 
The principal refused to accept liability towards the employees of its 
contractors; however, the court found that both the principal and the 
contractors were liable, as a joint entity, a so-called “complex employer.” 
As the court stated: 
If we pretend to ignore the legal category of the complex employer 
merely because there is no rule establishing such legal category, we 
would introduce an extreme and outmoded positivist paradigm into 
our court and would show a want of protective constitutional 
foundation . . . which served as the foundation of Work Law 
doctrine and jurisprudence. This is for two reasons. First, principles 
inform the entire legal system. . . . Second, because the mandate of 
article 53 of the constitution is directed not only at the legislator but 
also at [the judges].
94
 
Hence, the Uruguayan Court of Appeals established that because higher 
ordered principles informed the law, a so-called “complex employer”—a 
 
 
 93. Uruguay Court of Appeals, Montevideo, Primer Turno, Case No. 171 (2008), cited in 233 
DERECHO LABORAL: REVISTA DE DOCTRINA, JURISPRUDENCIA E INFORMACIONES SOCIALES 120 
(2009) [hereinafter Uruguay Court of Appeals]. 
 94. The full Spanish original reference says:  
[p]retender desconocer la figura del empleador complejo bajo el expediente de la inexistencia 
de norma alguna que lo consagre, importa, una postura positivista a ultranza paradigma de 
tiempos perimidos y el desconocimiento de las bases constitucionales protectoras que han 
dado origen y desarrollo a la disciplina Derecho del Trabajo y a la labor creativa con el 
mismo designio, de la doctrina y de la jurisprudencia. Ello por dos razones. La primera, 
porque los principios cumplen un papel informador de todo el ordenamiento jurídico, en tanto 
expresan los postulados, valores y principios éticos arraigados en la conciencia social cuya 
vigencia el juez puede constatar mediante mecanismos técnicos que evitan el puro 
subjetivismo o la arbitrariedad de la decisión. La segunda, porque el mandato constitucional 
protector del trabajo –arts. 53 y sgtes.- no solo va dirigido al legislador, sino también a los 
operadores jurídicos. Entre ellos, sin duda al juez en la labor de solución de conflictos a través 
de la aplicación de las reglas del universo jurídico. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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combination of the principal and the contractors—could be held jointly 
liable for the nonpayment of wages of the contractors’ employees. There 
was a mandate of constitutional scope to uphold the protective principle of 
work law. In this case, even though the law was silent regarding the 
liability of principals towards the employees of its subcontractors, the 
principle of protection compelled the court to find the principal liable. 
Otherwise, the workers in the case would have been left unprotected and 
unpaid, despite the constitutional and legislative intent to protect workers 
from wage theft and similar abuse. 
Uruguay, like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recognizes a work law 
protective principle through a combination of its Constitution, 
jurisprudence, and case law. 
E. Europe 
The protective principle is not a Latin American invention. It exists in 
one way or another in European work law. In Italy, traditional work law 
doctrine has emphasized the need to protect the worker because of his or 
her weaker bargaining position and subordination to the employer and the 
moral implications surrounding commodification. For example, renowned 
Italian Professor Gino Giugni argued that social and protective legislation, 
including work law, limited individual autonomy in order to restrict the 
more extreme forms of exploitation, such as that of children.
95
 Another 
Italian Professor, Luisa Riva Sanseverino, argued that the employment 
contract touched upon an individual’s personhood and humanity, which 
made the employment contract different from any other type of contracts, 
requiring special protections for workers.
96
 More recently, professors 
Mattia Persiani and Giampiero Proia argued that work law balances 
worker protection and employer requirements for productivity and 
efficiency.
97
 Despite the competing interests of workers and employers, 
Persiani and Proia emphasized that the protection of workers is an 
essential foundation of any society that wishes to respect human values.
98
  
In France, traditional work law doctrine also has emphasized the 
protective nature of work law. French professor Jean-Claude Javillier, for 
example, has argued that work law historically has been oriented towards 
 
 
 95. G. GIUGNI, LAVORO LEGGE CONTRATTI 252 (1989). 
 96. L. RIVA SANSEVERINO, ELEMENTI DI DIRITTO SINDACALE E DEL LAVORO 78 (1980). 
 97. PROIA GIAMPIERO & PERSIANI MATTIA, DIRITTO DEL LAVORO 126–27 (2008) 
 98. Id. 
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protecting workers from all forms of social exploitation, particularly given 
workers’ subordination to employers.99  
Even in Great Britain, where Anglo-American liberalism has 
traditionally taken root, scholars have also made reference to protection of 
the weak. Professor Hugh Collins argues that British work law has been 
influenced by the European social model, which is based on social 
inclusion, competitiveness, and citizenry.
100
 As a result, British work law 
accepts the precept that labor is not a commodity.
101
 As Professor Collins 
wrote: “This concept of employment law suggests that at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century these three themes [social inclusion, 
competitiveness, and citizenry] provide the core of a distinctive European 
response to the puzzles presented by the cry that labour is not a 
commodity.”102 These examples indicate European countries also 
recognize something akin to the protective principle to which Latin 
American scholars explicitly make reference. 
II. WHEN IN DOUBT, RULE IN FAVOR OF THE WEAKER PARTY: THE RULE 
OF IN DUBIO PRO OPERARIO 
Latin American labor judges and scholars commonly apply the rule of 
in dubio pro operario—when in doubt, decide in favor of the worker—as 
a fundamental manifestation of the principle of protection.
103
 In essence, 
the rule states that the judge should rule in favor of the employee in hard 
cases. Doubts that may trigger the rule of in dubio pro operario are those 
that occur when the relevant legal rule, contract or internal rule is 
(1) ambiguous or vague, (2) when there is a “gap” because the facts are so 
 
 
 99. JEAN-CLAUDE JAVILLIER, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 51–53 (5th ed. 1996). French professor 
Nadège Meyer also explains that the notion of “social public order” inherent to work law which seeks 
protection of the weaker party, in this case the worker. NADEGE MEYER, L’ORDRE PUBLIC EN DROIT 
DU TRAVAIL 99 (2006). See also Gerard Vachet, Le principe de faveur dans les rapports entre sources 
de droit, LES PRINCIPES DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA CHAMBRE SOCIALE DE LA COUR DE 
CASSATION, 79 (2008) (explaining the application of the principle of favor in French jurisprudence). 
See also infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (explaining the principle of favor) 
 100. HUGH COLLINS, EMPLOYMENT LAW 25–26 (2d ed. 2010). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Contrary to stylized view that in civil code countries judges do not make law or interpret law, 
but only “apply” the law, in South American law there is a general “principle of no excuse.” MARIO 
VERDUGO MARINKOVIC ET AL., DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 209–10 (1999). The principle of no 
excuse essentially means that the judge, if competent, must decide a case or controversy even when 
there is no specific rule resolving the dispute. Id. The only exception occurs in penal law, in which the 
law must establish the criminal conduct be sanctioned. ALAN BRONFMAN VARGAS ET AL., 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA COMENTADA 116 (2012).  
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novel and unforeseeable that no rules are deemed to apply, or (3) when the 
strict application of the rule appears to be iniquitous.
104
 
The application of the rule of in dubio pro operario is debatable in the 
ambit of collective bargaining because some scholars have argued there is 
no significant imbalance of bargaining power between labor and capital in 
collective labor relations.
105
 Labor unions bargain with employers at a 
relatively more equal level than that of the individual employee.
106
 
Therefore, most scholars have argued that civil contract interpretation 
rules are adequate in the collective bargaining context.
107
  
The in dubio pro operario rule is mainly used to give meaning to the 
law, individual contract or company rule and not to interpret the facts of 
cases.
108 
The function of the rule in dubio pro operario is not to modify or 
amend a rule, but rather to determine its best meaning among several 
possible ones. Moreover, in dubio pro operario is often used by judges not 
as a final decisive criterion in litigation, but merely as a supporting 
argument;
109
 however, some judges in Latin America may decide cases 
inapposite to the black letter, bright-line rules when strict abidance with 
such rules would issue an unfair outcome.
110
 While scholars generally 
disapprove of decisions stemming only from judges’ justice concerns, 
some posit that in those situations the judge or other adjudicator should at 
least not lose sight of the protective nature of work law.
111
 The pro 
operario criterion, or simply, a motivation to protect the worker, should 
govern the rationale of the judge when acting in equity to establish a rule 
for the case.
112
 
 
 
 104. Enrique Barros, Reglas y Principios en el Derecho, 2 ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA JURÍDICA Y 
SOCIAL 276 (1984).  
 105. PLÁ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 37, at 96–97. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. However, for a dissident view, see SERGIO GAMONAL C., DERECHO COLECTIVO DEL 
TRABAJO 448 (2d ed. 2011) (because collective bargaining agreements have ergo omnes effects and 
may apply to all workers, including non-members of the union, the rule of in dubio pro operario 
should apply when there is an interpretative question of the collective agreement). 
 108. The main exception to this view of the rule is Argentina. Article 9 of the Employment 
Contract Law, which provides that the legal interpretation most favorable to the worker must be 
preferred when in doubt of the facts in concrete cases. Diego Tosca, Aplicación del Principio ‘Pro 
Operario’ en la Valoración de la Prueba en caso de Duda, LA RELACIÓN DE TRABAJO 210–11(Mario 
E. Ackerman & Alejandro Sudera eds., 2009). 
 109. Aurelio Desdentado Bonete, El Principio Pro Operario, LOS PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO DEL 
TRABAJO 73 (Luis Enrique de la Villa Gil & Lourdes López eds., 2003). 
 110. GAMONAL C., FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 37, at 107. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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In Chile, the rule of in dubio pro operario has been discussed most 
often by scholars.
113
 As previously discussed, in Argentina the 
Employment Contract Law has established the rule: 
If the question depends on the interpretation or scope of the law, or 
on the appreciation of the concrete facts, the judges or other persons 
charged with applying the law must decide in the manner most 
favorable to the worker.
114
  
Although Uruguay has not established in dubio pro operario by statute, 
the rule has been widely disseminated by scholars
115
 and has been applied 
by the courts.
116
 
In Brazil, the Labor Court has used the rule extensively. For example, 
in Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Empresas Ferroviárias dos Estados do 
Espírito Santo e Minas Gerais, the Court had to decide whether an 
employer was required to continue providing performance pay to its 
workers after having provided it voluntarily.
117
 The internal regulations of 
the employer stated that it would provide performance pay.
118
 The 
employer argued that it did not have to continue giving performance pay 
to its workers because the law did not mandate performance pay; the 
employer had voluntarily granted performance pay to its workers and 
could stop providing it at will.
119
 The employer rested its argument on 
language in the civil law, which stated, “donations and waivers are to be 
 
 
 113. Id. at 106–09. 
 114. Labor Contract Law [L.C.L.], art. 9, available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/ 
anexos/25000-29999/25552/texact.htm, (Arg.). The text of the statute reads: 
Art. 9°—El principio de la norma más favorable para el trabajador. 
 En caso de duda sobre la aplicación de normas legales o convencionales prevalecerá la 
más favorable al trabajador, considerándose la norma o conjuntos de normas que rija cada una 
de las instituciones del derecho del trabajo. 
 Si la duda recayese en la interpretación o alcance de la ley, o en apreciación de la prueba 
en los casos concretos, los jueces o encargados de aplicarla se decidirán en el sentido más 
favorable al trabajador. 
L.C.L., art. 9 (Arg.). 
 115. See PLÁ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 37, at 84.  
 116. As the Juzgado de Letras del Trabajo del Tercer Turno stated, “. . . the rule of in dubio pro 
operario is applicable, which means that in case of doubt we should decide in favor of the worker’s 
situation”. Id. at 99, citing Anuario de Jurisprudencia Laboral, Caso 1032 (1994–1995) (Uru.). See 
also Anuario de Jurisprudencia Laboral, Caso 1032 (1994–1995), 1034 (1994–1995), 1035 (1994–
1995), 1031 (1994–1995) (Uru.), as cited in PLÁ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 37, at 84. 
 117. TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DO TRABALHO [T.S.T.] [LABOR COURT], No. 127200-
25.2007.5.03.0102 (Braz.) *6-7 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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interpreted restrictively.”120 It argued that as a voluntary payment that 
resembled a donation, the Court could not presuppose that the employer 
would indefinitely grant performance pay to all workers.
121
 The Labor 
Court rejected the employer’s argument and held in favor of the workers: 
[Civil law] could not be transposed uncritically into work law, 
[because work law] is ruled, inter alia, by the principles of 
protection and in dubio pro operario. Thus, if a particular 
standard—and the internal rules of the company are such—provides 
a particular benefit [to the workers], it is not a prima facie hindrance 
to provide the benefit [to the workers] in situations unforeseen by 
the [employer].
122
  
The Brazilian labor court clearly differentiated the principles of work law 
and civil law. It preferentially recognized the protective principle and the 
rule of in dubio pro operario.
123
 
 Pro-worker rules also exist outside of Latin America. Germany and 
France also have somewhat similar rules that favor employees. While not 
a rule regarding interpretation of legal norms, the German “principle of 
favorability” is used by German courts to determine which contractual 
terms operate, those in a collective agreement or those in an individual 
employment contract, when they are in conflict. According to the German 
rule, the judge must choose the term most favorable to the worker when 
there are conflicting terms.
124
 
The French also have a “rule of favor,” which implies that the 
conditions most favorable to the worker must be preferred when there is a 
conflict of laws. The rule of favor becomes most relevant when work laws 
stipulate minima and the parties have modified those minima by contract. 
The rule implies that minima can be repealed only in favor of the worker; 
modified rules can only improve the minimum benefits granted by the 
law.
125
 
 
 
 120. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 114 (Braz.) (“Os negócios jurídicos benéficos e a 
renúncia interpretam-se estritamente.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DO TRABALHO [T.S.T.] [LABOR COURT], No. 127200-
25.2007.5.03.0102 (Braz.) (emphasis added). 
 123. Other Latin American countries including Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, El Salvador 
and Guatemala, have incorporated the rule of in dubio pro operario. PLÁ RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 37, 
at 98. 
 124. MANFRED WEISS & MARLENE SCHMIDT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
GERMANY § 446 (4th ed. 2008). See also ROGER BLANPAIN, THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 587 (2d ed. 2012). 
 125. JEAN PELISSIER ET AL., DROIT DU TRAVAIL 133–35 (24th ed. 2008). 
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III. VIEWING THE U.S. FROM THE SOUTH AND FINDING THE PROTECTIVE 
PRINCIPLE 
The authors acknowledge that existing U.S. case law is inconsistent 
when it comes to worker protection. In fact, many times it simply does not 
protect workers, but rather favors employer interests; however, we can 
find a principle of protection and use it to prospectively reconstruct the 
law. The authors limit their analysis, for reasons of time and space, to the 
Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the NLRA, the FLSA, 
and relevant scholarship. In their future scholarship, the authors expect to 
show how the principle of protection can be found in other work law 
statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
126
 and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act,
127
 among others. 
A. The Protective Principle in the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution 
The great bulk of American work law statutes have found 
constitutional validity in the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
128
 
However, commercial bias inherent in such a clause enabled or motivated 
U.S. courts to interpret some aspects of statutory work law in favor of 
employers.
129
 Given the weaker constitutional basis for worker protection 
found in the Commerce Clause, leading American constitutional law 
scholars have argued that constitutional validity of labor protections 
should rest on the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
130
 The 
Thirteenth Amendment provides the basis for worker protective legislation 
 
 
 126. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub.L. No. 88–352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17)). 
 127. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 
(1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2012)). 
 128. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the NLRA under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution); U.S. v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding the constitutionality of the FLSA under the Commerce Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) 
(Upholding the constitutionality of Title VII under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution).  
 129. James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of 
Involuntary Servitude, 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1541 (2010) [hereinafter Pope, Contract, Race and 
Freedom of Labor]; William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 174 
(2001). 
 130. Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1541; Forbath, supra note 
129, at 174; María Linda Ontiveros, NonCitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment: 
Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL L. REV. 923 (2007) (arguing that guest worker 
programs violate the Thirteenth Amendment). 
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through the ban of involuntary servitude.
131
 It gives Congress the power to 
enact legislation to give effect to that constitutional ban. As Professor 
Rebecca Zietlow explains, the ban on involuntary servitude was aimed not 
just at coerced forms of compulsory labor, but “protects a broad spectrum 
of workers’ rights and civil rights, and gives Congress broad authority to 
enforce those rights.”132 
Indeed, workers have attempted, albeit not always successfully, to 
secure an amalgam of rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, including 
the right to change employers, the right to set wages, the right to refrain 
from work, the right to practice one’s trade, the right to receive fair wages 
and the right to strike, all giving credence to claim that the ban against 
involuntary servitude was, at least popularly and historically, meaningful 
beyond mere chattel slavery.
133
 
The notion that ordinary employees were subject to “slavery” was a 
response to nothing other than the common law.
134
 Common law judges 
would normally hold that workers’ collective actions, attempts to unionize, 
strike and bargain collectively violated employers’ property rights, 
acquired through contract.
135
 As Professor William Forbath explained: 
Not liberty of contract alone, but also the legacy of the antislavery 
movement and the Thirteenth Amendment lent constitutional heft to 
labor’s blows against its court-forged manacles. According to this 
legacy, the dignity and independence of free labor were inscribed in 
the Constitution. It smacked of slavery, trade unionists complained, 
or of feudalism, at best, when courts routinely held that employers 
had a property right in their workers’ returning each day to toil in 
the employers’ plants, or a property right in their workers’ non-
union status, or a property right in their authority to run the plant 
 
 
 131. James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 944 (1997) 
[hereinafter Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom]; Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, 
supra note 129, at 1541; Forbath, supra note 129, at 174; Ontiveros, supra note 129, at 924–25; Lea S. 
Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 441–45 (1989). 
 132. Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 
393, 448 (2012) (citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968)). 
 133. Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1478 n.4. See also WILLIAM 
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1102–65, 1294 (1991) 
(Kindle Edition) (providing a historical account of how labor framed its defense of strikes and other 
concerted activities under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 134. Forbath, supra note 129, at 186. 
 135. Id. 
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without contending with workers seeking to negotiate over union 
work rules.
136
  
Some workers thus attempted to gain a foothold for their rights of 
association in the Thirteenth Amendment. 
While the Supreme Court initially rejected a broader reading of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, later case law gave a more expansive view of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Workers found constitutional bases for the 
fundamental labor rights to quit working under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.
137
 The constitutionality of Section 1982 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866,
138
 which forbids race discrimination in inheritance, purchase, 
lease, sale, holding, and conveyance of personal and real property, also 
found an anchor on the Thirteenth Amendment.
139
 
The reasons why twentieth century labor and employment laws were 
not based on the Thirteenth Amendment are complex and contested in the 
legal-historical literature. Professor James Pope argued that New Dealers 
were interested in securing the rights of government technocrats and 
regulators to manage the American economy, rather than to give that 
authority to workers.
140
 Professor William Forbath disagrees with Pope, 
arguing that the New Dealers were clinging onto a social citizenship 
constitutionalism where citizens had constitutional economic and social 
rights and Congress had “the duty to exercise its power to govern 
economic and social life in a way that sought to secure those rights.”141 
New Dealers sought to constitutionalize labor law on the will of the people 
who want to protect constitutionally given social and economic rights, 
channeled through Congress. 
Regardless of the historical origins for the constitutionalizing of work 
laws through the Commerce Clause, and not the Thirteenth Amendment, 
 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). 
 139. Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1519; Zietlow, supra note 
132, at 451. 
 140. James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the 
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 84–85 (2002). 
 141. Forbath, supra note 129, at 176. Certainly, the New Dealers were attempting to find a 
constitutional anchor to their legislation in light of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Early 
labor protective legislation favoring women and children, among others, took an explicit protective 
tone to safeguard the “health, safety and morals” put in danger by contracts made by parties with 
differing degrees of bargaining power. See Claudio Katz, Protective Labor Legislation in the Courts: 
Substantive Due Process and Fairness in the Progressive Era, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 275, 280, 294, 323 
(2013). However, after Lochner v. New York, where a New York statute regulating the hours of bakers 
was held unconstitutional for violating freedom of contract, federal work laws such as the FLSA and 
the NLRA were defended constitutionally as part of congressional regulation of interstate commerce. 
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some contemporary U.S. scholars have been arguing that work law should 
find a constitutional anchor in the Thirteenth Amendment.
142
 The 
argument is straightforward: the Thirteenth Amendment supports 
protective labor legislation because workers who are forced to work by 
conditions that they cannot control, including, for example, when they 
cannot strike, only makes their working conditions more onerous, 
exploitative, and necessarily un-free.
143
 Therefore, Congress should 
legislate to protect workers and, in this manner, protect their freedom.  
In Pollock v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that that 
Thirteenth Amendment can serve as basis to protect ordinary workers and 
not just chattel slaves.
144
 Compulsory labor is detrimental to workers 
because it makes it impossible for them to fight long hours, low wages, 
and other oppressive terms and conditions of employment.
145
 When they 
cannot change those circumstances, workers become even more un-free.
146
 
Moreover, even when only some groups of workers toil under unwanted 
conditions, other workers’ conditions may also suffer, bringing all 
workers’ conditions down and limiting freedom to all.147 As the Court 
stated: 
[T]he defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or 
treatment is the right to change employers. When the master can 
compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there 
is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a 
harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work. Resulting 
depression of working conditions and living standards affects not 
only the laborer under the system, but every other with whom his 
labor comes in competition.
148
  
In other words, and as Professor Archibald Cox long argued, when 
workers have “no power below” and employers “the incentive above” to 
prevent “a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work” 
workers are un-free and Congress should legislate under the Thirteenth 
 
 
 142. Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1541; Forbath, supra note 
129, at 174; Ontiveros, supra note 130 (arguing that guest worker programs violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 143. Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1552. 
 144. 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
 145. Id. at 18. 
 146. Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1479, citing Archibald Cox, 
Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 576–77 (1951). 
 147. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. at 18. 
 148. Id. 
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Amendment to redress that problem.
149
 The Constitutional ban on 
compulsory labor would thus justify labor protective legislation. 
A constitutional right in favor of labor protection would buttress 
workers’ rights by, for example, extending associational rights to 
domestic, agricultural, and other workers not currently covered by the 
NLRA, and could serve to reverse the practice of permanent strike 
replacements, as well as other rules that currently limit workers’ 
protections in the U.S.
150
 Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment fits hand-
in-glove for worker protection. 
A Latin American jurist would likely agree with the view that a 
constitutional protection against involuntary servitude provides a basis to 
constitutionally legitimize labor protective legislation. In fact, the 
Thirteenth Amendment would essentially mandate such legislation from 
Congress and all federal laws must be read with that mandate in mind.  
The Latin American jurist would also likely see the inherent protective 
principle in the Thirteenth Amendment. As we read above, unregulated 
and legally unprotected work is understood in the Latin America as a 
condition that easily lends itself to the commodification of labor—to the 
buying and selling of labor as a chattel or an article of trade. The authors 
would add that commoditized workers compete with each other to sell 
their labor, driving down their wages and accepting increasingly onerous 
terms, enabling exploitation, and adopting even slave-like working 
conditions, demonstrating the need for legal protection of work. The 
Thirteenth Amendment also protects human dignity, a concern equally 
important in Latin American work law.
151
 In this fashion, a Latin 
American labor judge would naturally read a constitutional mandate for 
labor protections under the Thirteenth Amendment. With such a 
constitutional basis for work laws, interpretation of legal texts would find 
a much more solid footing in favor of workers. 
But even without such a robust, constitutionalized reading of 
protection, as we will see below, U.S. work law statutes provide language 
in favor of worker protection. The constitutional anchor would lodge those 
protections more solidly in the U.S. legal landscape, but the statutes 
themselves also reflect a protective principle.  
 
 
 149. Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1479. 
 150. Id. at 1541; On permanent strike replacements under U.S. labor law see NLRB v. Mackay 
Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
 151. See Forbath, supra note 129, at 186, 192. 
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B. The Protective Principle in the FLSA 
The FLSA is perhaps the federal work law statue that comes closer to 
reflect a protective principle in its plain text. Section 2 of the FLSA states 
that the main goal of the FLSA is to correct and eliminate commercial 
practices that perpetuate workers’ substandard living conditions.152 The 
purpose of said protections are to safeguard commerce from disruptions, 
obstructions and similar problems.
153
 The FLSA attempts to fix these 
market failures by protecting workers. In fact, market failures are 
generally understood as necessary to justify labor market regulations in 
Anglo-American jurisdictions. Unequal bargaining power is 
insufficient.
154
 
Resting on Section 2 of the FLSA and its legislative history, the 
Supreme Court has sustained that the FLSA protects workers to defend the 
national economy. In one of the key FLSA cases, Brooklyn Savings Bank 
v. O’Neil,155 the Supreme Court declared that: 
The legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows an 
intent on the part of Congress to protect certain groups of the 
population from substandard wages and excessive hours which 
endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of 
goods in interstate commerce. The statute was a recognition of the 
fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between the 
employer and employee, certain segments of the population 
required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts 
on their part which endangered national health and efficiency and as 
a result the free movement of goods in interstate commerce. To 
 
 
 152. As the FLSA states in Section 2: 
 (a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers. . . 
 (b) It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through the exercise by Congress of its 
power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, to correct and 
as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries 
without substantially curtailing employment or earning power. 
29 U.S.C. § 202. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Lord Wedderburn, Common Law, Labour Law, Global Law, SOCIAL AND LABOUR 
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 27 (Bob Hepple ed., 2002). 
 155. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945). 
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accomplish this purpose [,] standards of minimum wages and 
maximum hours were provided.
156
 
Minimum wage standards, maximum hours, bars against child labor, all of 
which are practices regulated by the FLSA are geared towards protecting 
workers. In this fashion, and as in Latin America, the FLSA protects 
workers. 
The Supreme Court has also recognized something like the rule of in 
dubio pro operario when interpreting the FLSA. In Tennessee Coal, Iron 
& R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123
157
 the Court ruled in favor of workers in a 
hard case given the “remedial” and “humanitarian” purposes of the 
FLSA.
158
 The Court determined that the time spent by miners traveling 
underground in mines to and from the “working face”, i.e., the place in the 
mine where miners drill and load ore, constituted compensable “work” or 
“employment” under the FLSA.159 The legal question was hard because, as 
the Court determined, the statute failed to define “work” or 
“employment”.160 A definition was necessary to understand if time spent 
by workers trying to get to the working face of the mine was compensable 
under the law. The Court decided that a broad interpretation of those terms 
—“work” and “employment”—favoring workers was required; the Court 
stated: 
But these provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, are remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are 
not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with the 
rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of 
their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others. Those are 
the rights that Congress has specially legislated to protect. Such a 
statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging 
manner.
161
 
The Court determined that workers were not chattels or articles of trade 
under the “remedial and humanitarian” purposes of the law. Hence, the 
 
 
 156. Id. at 706–07 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). As the Court further 
substantiated, “The legislative debates indicate that the prime purpose of the legislation was to aid the 
unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation’s working population; that is, those employees 
who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.” Id. at 
707 n.81 (internal citations omitted). 
 157. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). 
 158. Id. at 597–98. 
 159. Id. at 598. 
 160. Id. at 597. 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
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FLSA required compensation for all actual work performed by covered 
employees, including traveling inside the mines to the working face.
162
 
The Court decided the legal question in the light most favorable to worker, 
as a Latin American labor judge would have done adjudicating under the 
rule of in dubio pro operario. 
Tennessee Coal has been cited more recently by the Supreme Court 
precisely to underline why the FLSA’s protections deserve a broad 
interpretation in favor of workers. In IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
163
 the Supreme 
Court stated: 
In Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123 . . . we 
held that time spent traveling from iron ore mine portals to 
underground working areas was compensable; relying on the 
remedial purposes of the statute and Webster's Dictionary, we 
described “work or employment” as “physical or mental exertion 
(whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the 
employer and his business.”164 
A broad interpretation of the FLSA was thus warranted given its 
“remedial” purpose. In this fashion, today’s Supreme Court validated 
something akin to in dubio pro operario. 
We should underline that today’s Supreme Court focuses on the 
legislative purposes of the FLSA to fill in the gaps or give meaning to 
vague language. The legal controversy in IBP was somewhat similar to the 
one decided decades earlier in Tennessee Coal. The employer in IBP 
argued that under the so-called Portal-to-Portal amendments made to the 
FLSA by Congress in 1948,
165
 walking time on the premises of the 
employer to the actual place of performance of the “principal activity” of 
the employee was not compensable. Therefore, the employer argued that 
the time spent by its employees walking between locker rooms and the 
 
 
 162. The Court held: 
Viewing the facts of this case as found by both courts below in the light of the foregoing 
considerations, we are unwilling to conclude that the underground travel in petitioners’ iron 
ore mines cannot be construed as work or employment within the meaning of the Act. The 
exacting and dangerous conditions in the mine shafts stand as mute, unanswerable proof that 
the journey from and to the portal involves continuous physical and mental exertion as well as 
hazards to life and limb. And this compulsory travel occurs entirely on petitioners’ property 
and is at all times under their strict control and supervision. 
Id. at 598. 
 163. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). 
 164. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 165. See 29 U.S.C. § 251. 
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work area after donning and before doffing was not compensable under 
the FLSA. The reason why such walking was not compensable was 
because it was “preliminary or postliminary” to the “principal activity” 
performed by the workers.
166
  
The Court noted that the Portal-to-Portal Act had indeed narrowed the 
FLSA. It established that travel time to and from work was not 
compensable under the FLSA. However, the Supreme Court determined 
the activities in question in IBP were compensable. It held that workers’ 
donning protective clothes was indispensable to a principal activity that 
started the workday. Therefore, walking to the actual place where the 
employee had to work after donning was compensable. Walking from the 
place of actual work to where he or she had to doff was also compensable. 
The Court reached this conclusion by adding Congressional intent to its 
analysis. According to the Court, Congress could have not “intended to 
create an intermediate category of activities that would be sufficiently 
‘principal’ to be compensable, but not sufficiently principal to commence 
the workday.”167  
In another recent case, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corporation,
168
 the Supreme Court also interpreted the FLSA broadly, this 
time to determine that a worker who orally complained to the employer 
about FLSA violations was protected by the anti-retaliatory provisions of 
the Act, even though the FLSA did not clearly state that oral complaints 
were protected by it. As in IBP, the Court reached its conclusion based on 
the protective purposes of the FLSA.
169
 
In his complaint, the plaintiff-employee alleged that he orally 
complained to the employer about certain “time locks” put by the 
employer, which made it impossible for workers to charge the company 
for donning and doffing, activities that are compensable under the FLSA if 
they are part of a “principal activity.”170 The plaintiff alleged that he was 
fired shortly after making his complaint to the employer. The employer 
argued that the anti-retaliation provision did not apply to the plaintiff 
because an oral complaint to the employer did not rise to the level of 
“filing a complaint,” to trigger protection under the statute.171  
 
 
 166. IBP, 546 U.S. at 27. 
 167. Id. at 35. 
 168. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1329 (2011) (citing 29 
U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West)). 
 169. Id. at 1333. 
 170. Id. at 1329–30; ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT 8-50 to 8-52 (Ellen C. Kearns ed., 2010 & 2012 Suppl.). 
 171. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1330. 
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Both the trial court and the court of appeals agreed with the employer. 
The Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, reversed the courts below. 
According to the Court, the FLSA forbids employers from retaliating 
against employees who have filed any complaint alleging a violation of the 
FLSA. According to the FLSA, an employer may not, 
discharge or in any other way discriminate against any employee 
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or 
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the Act] 
or has testified or is about to testify in such proceeding, or has 
served or is about to serve on an industry committee.
172
  
In reversing the courts below, Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of the 
majority, emphasized that the statute “protects employees who have ‘filed 
any complaint.’”173 After looking at dictionary definitions of the word 
“filed,” the Court determined that a textual reading of the statutory 
provision could not settle the question of whether any filed complaint 
included written and oral complaints.
174
 The anti-retaliation provision was 
open to competing interpretations.
175
 To better interpret the statute, the 
Court’s majority turned to the expressed intentions of the law, which were, 
under Section 202 of the FLSA, to “prohibit ‘labor conditions detrimental 
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for 
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.’”176 According to 
the Court, the FLSA protects workers by creating specific labor standards 
and by seeking enforcement of those standards through direct complaints 
 
 
 172. Id. at 1329 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West)) (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. at 1330 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West)). 
 174. Id. at 1333. 
 175. Justice Breyer started his analysis by first using dictionary definitions of the word “file” to 
determine if regular usage of the word was definite enough to make a determination about the matter. 
After looking at various dictionary definitions, he determined that some dictionary definitions would 
not limit the scope of “filing” to written communications. Finding no consensus in dictionary 
definitions which can determine the common usage of the word “file” and whether its scope includes 
oral communications or not, Justice Breyer turned to the manner in which legislators, administrators, 
and judges use the term. Here he found that these institutional actors used the terms in ways that 
sometimes included oral communications.  
 The Justice then remarked that while the law states “filing any complaint,” “filing” taken alone 
may be read restrictively to include only written communications, but the use of “any” broadens the 
scope of the three-letter phrase. The Justice determined that the three-letter phrase, on its own, “cannot 
answer the interpretative question.” Usage of the term “file” in the rest of the FLSA also could not lead 
to a conclusive answer as to its meaning. Other statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act, use 
different language, so they could also not serve as sources for definitive answers on the issue. Id. at 
1331–33.  
 176. Id. at 1333 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). 
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from the workers. Congress put in place anti-retaliation protections to 
make the overall labor protections effective.
177
  
Searching further for Congressional purpose, the Court argued that 
there was no reason Congress might have wanted to limit enforcement of 
the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision to cases involving written 
complaints.
178
 First, when the law was enacted in the late 1930s, there was 
a high level of illiteracy among U.S. workers.
179
 Limiting enforcement to 
situations in which workers filed written complaints would have excluded 
from protection a very large segment of worker complaints, leaving 
unprotected the most vulnerable employees and those most in need of 
FLSA protection.
180
 Second, a limitation to written complaints would have 
prevented enforcement of the statute through hotlines, interviews, and 
other oral methods of communications that are commonly used today.
181
 
Third, because the Secretary of Labor consistently had held that the words 
“filed any complaint” in the above-quoted provision covered oral 
complaints and that interpretation of the statute was rational, the Court 
could defer to the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the law.182 
Therefore, in St. Gobain Performance Plastics, the Court chose the 
interpretation of the statute most favorable to workers after searching the 
words of the statute and the purposes of the law; it found that the 
Congressional purpose was to protect workers, and, as a result, determined 
that excluding oral complaints would have frustrated Congress’ 
intentions.
183
  
Of course, not all FLSA case law has favored workers. Indeed, in 
another very recent Supreme Court case, the Court determined that 
“medical detailers” or employees of a pharmaceutical firm who did not 
sell anything or make any commissions fell under the “outside salesman” 
 
 
 177. Id. at 1333. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 1333–34. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. at 1334. 
 182. Id. at 1336. 
 183. In his dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) argued that under a textual analysis, 
the word “complaint” in the statute applied only to formal, legal complaints, either at the 
administrative or judicial levels, not to informal complaints presented to the employer, as was the case 
in Saint Gobain. Therefore, under a textual meaning of the law, the employee was not protected. Id. at 
1337–38.  
 The Court majority found the dissent’s arguments irrelevant because the question before the Court 
was not whether or not complaints filed with the employer rather than with the administrative or 
judicial forum were protected by the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA. Rather, the question 
presented to the Court by the appellants was whether or not oral complaints were covered by such 
provision. Id. at 1334. 
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exception of the FLSA, disqualifying the medical detailers from overtime 
pay under the law.
184
 The medical detailers’ job was to promote their 
employer’s product; they informed doctors of the drugs made by their 
employer so that the doctors would consider prescribing the drugs to 
patients.
185
 The medical detailers were more akin to “nonexempt 
promotional employees” who stimulate sales made by others, the 
drugstores.
186
 However, the Court decided that the medical detailers were 
exempt as “outside salesmen” by expanding the meaning of the word 
“sale”; as the majority stated: 
[I]t follows that petitioners made sales for purposes of the FLSA 
and therefore are exempt outside salesmen within the meaning of 
the DOL’s regulations. Obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a 
physician to prescribe one of respondent’s drugs is the most that 
petitioners were able to do to ensure the eventual disposition of the 
products that respondent sells. This kind of arrangement, in the 
unique regulatory environment within which pharmaceutical 
companies must operate. . . .
187
 
The majority’s opinion strongly suggests that the interpretation of what an 
outside salesman and a “sale” is depends on the industry’s needs and the 
“regulatory environment.” Doctors cannot buy drugs from pharmaceutical 
companies and re-sell them to patients. They merely prescribe drugs. 
Pharmacies sell the drugs to patients with prescriptions. This regulatory 
arrangement, where the pharmaceutical firms could not sell directly to 
doctors and doctors to patients, seemed to matter a lot to the Court 
majority when it decided that the medical detailers—who sold nothing but 
promoted the products of their employer—were outside salesman.188 
A careful reading of the case additionally alerts us to why the Court 
stretched the statute in favor of the employer; the medical detailers made 
about $70,000 dollars, annually.
189
 Such higher paid workers, in the view 
of the five justices who signed off on the majority opinion, were not 
protected by the FLSA.
190
 The Court stated, “Petitioners—each of whom 
earned an average of more than $70,000 per year and spent between 10 
and 20 hours outside normal business hours each week performing work 
 
 
 184. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170 (2012). 
 185. Id. at 2163–64. 
 186. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.503 (2011). 
 187. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 2172. 
 188. Id. at 2172–73. 
 189. Id. at 2173. 
 190. Id. 
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related to his assigned portfolio of drugs in his assigned sales territory—
are hardly the kind of employees that the FLSA was intended to 
protect.”191  
Nothing in the FLSA says that workers who make $70,000 dollars or 
more are exempt from overtime protections. Perhaps the rule the Court 
decided to follow in Christopher was something akin to in dubio pro 
bulla—when in doubt, rule in favor of the employer? 
In the authors’ view, tainted by a Latin American lens, Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham was not even a “hard case.” Medical detailers did not 
sell anything in the ordinary sense of the word and made no commissions. 
They could not be considered outside salesmen. As argued by the dissent 
in the same case, medical detailers promoted the sales of others as 
“nonexempt promotional employees.”192 However, even if there was a 
hard question before the Court, the FLSA does not support the conclusion 
that medical detailers who make $70,000 a year are exempt employees, at 
least not more so than the contrary. Part of the purpose of the FLSA is to 
protect workers, including from overwork. According to the majority’s 
own statement of the facts, detailers spent between 10 and 20 hours per 
week working in excess of 40 hours,
193
 time that they could have spent 
with their families or resting. Instead, the medical detailers were 
compelled to work without receiving payment for overwork. In the 
authors’ view, a Latin American labor judge would likely determine that 
given the rules in favor of overtime pay in the FLSA,
194
 and constitutional 
protections of work under the Thirteenth Amendment, the FLSA protects 
workers such as medical detailers by compelling employers to pay them 
overtime. Overwork exhausts the high and low paid alike.  
All this said, it is clear that Christopher is one of those cases where 
commercial interests prevailed over those of protecting workers. If courts 
recognized that there was a constitutional protection of work under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and that the FLSA is one of those statutes that aim 
to protect the freedom of individuals suffering employment, it would be 
 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 2177. 
 193. Id. at 2173. 
 194. As the FLSA clearly states: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees 
who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 
or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives 
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than 
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 
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easier to persuade future courts that medical detailers such as those in 
Christopher require protection from overwork. Employers require 
increasingly more onerous hours from “exempt” employees because they 
can, not only by leave of courts that narrowly interpret FLSA protections, 
but also because employers’ relatively higher level of bargaining power 
over workers gives employers the plain opportunity to require such 
onerous terms from employees. The fact that the U.S is one of the 
industrialized nations with the highest number of overworked workers, 
with the average hours worked per employee being among the highest in 
the industrialized world, attests to the need to protect American workers 
from overwork.
195
 With a constitutional mandate and a statute such as the 
FLSA protecting workers, commercial interests that favor uncompensated 
overwork can be better reined in and the freedom of workers such as 
medical detailers—who can be forced to work in economic conditions that 
are not of their making—can be better protected. 
C. The Protective Principle in the NLRA 
The NLRA also protects workers. It states the desirability of protecting 
the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively in order to 
equalize and correct power asymmetries between employers and 
workers.
196
 The text of the NLRA states:  
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards 
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes 
the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of 
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to 
the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of 
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by 
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees.
197
 
Different from the Latin American reasons for protection, which are based 
on the defense of workers’ dignity and safeguarding them from 
dehumanization when locked in unequal bargaining relationships with 
 
 
 195. For example, U.S. workers worked on average about 1,800 hours in 2009, compared to less 
than 1,400 hours in Germany, the leading manufacturing industrial democracy. See BLANPAIN ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 52. See id. for other comparators. 
 196. 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 197. Id.  
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employers, protection in the NLRA is instrumental to safeguard industrial 
peace and interstate commerce, or, some would argue, the market. Either 
because of the legacy of Lochner v. New York or attempts to legitimize 
government regulators, the drafters of the 1935 NLRA sought to 
constitutionalize the NLRA through the Commerce Clause and include 
this language regarding obstructions to commerce in the statute.
198
  
As argued earlier, however, the NLRA could have been 
constitutionalized through the Thirteenth Amendment to find a legally 
stronger protective base for workers. A Latin American jurist could 
effortlessly find a more protective constitutional basis for the NLRA under 
the Thirteenth Amendment, strengthening the statute’s protections of 
workers. 
But even if the NLRA’s protections of workers were a means to 
safeguard the market, the statute still protects workers in Section 7, the 
most important clause of the NLRA, which states, “[e]mployees shall have 
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . .”199 In this manner, the 
NLRA protects workers’ rights to engage in collective action not only for 
bargaining with the employer, but also for other reasons related to their 
“mutual aid and protection.”  
The law also establishes employer unfair labor practices to protect 
workers against employers who violate Section 7,
200
 dominate labor 
organizations,
201
 discriminate against workers for exercising their Section 
7 rights,
202
 retaliate against workers who have filed charges or given 
testimony under the NLRA,
203
 or fail to bargain in good faith with the 
union.
204
 
Some key NLRA cases have also shown that American work law 
jurisprudence can sometimes recognize the protective nature of work law, 
and, therefore, hold in a manner that interprets the law in favor of the 
worker. The need to protect workers’ right to act in concert for collective 
 
 
 198. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 31 (“[The NLRA] purports to reach only what 
may be deemed to burden or obstruct that commerce and, thus qualified, it must be construed as 
contemplating the exercise of control within constitutional bounds.”). 
 199. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 200. See id. § 158(a)(1). 
 201. See id. § 158(a)(2). 
 202. See id. § 158(a)(3). 
 203. See id. § 158(a)(4). 
 204. See id. § 158(a)(5). 
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bargaining and mutual aid and protection was very recently stressed by the 
National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as “NLRB” or 
“Board”) in D.R. Horton, Inc.205 The Board decided that an employer 
violates the NLRA if it compels an employee, as a condition of 
employment, to sign an agreement that precludes the employee from 
joining class or collective suits against employers in any forum, arbitral or 
judicial.
206
 In D.R. Horton, an employee had joined a collective action suit 
under the FLSA, not the NLRA.
207
 The employer attempted to bar the 
employee from joining the FLSA suit, alleging that the employee had 
signed an agreement with the employer promising not to participate in 
collective or class action suits of any kind.
208
 The NLRB stressed that 
 
 
 205. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012). However, the Fifth Circuit failed to enforce the Board’s order. 
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit held that the Board 
failed to consider the importance of the Federal Arbitration Act when it decided that an employee 
could waive his or her right to join class actions under the FLSA in lieu of individual arbitration. Id. 
As of this article other Federal Courts have also refused to follow D.R. Horton. The ruling has been 
controversial because courts have questioned the NLRB’s authority to interpret the Federal Arbitration 
Act, which creates the federal policy regarding arbitration of claims, even if it interrelates with the 
NLRA. See Delock v. Securitas, 883 F. Supp. 2d 784 (E.D. Ark. 2012) (D.R. Horton conflicts with the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAE”) because the FAE only requires that employees have some forum, 
arbitral or judicial, to hear their claims.); LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Serv., Inc., 2012 WL 124590, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (In the absence of explicit language in the FLSA providing an absolute right to join a 
class action, and given the expansive policy in favor of arbitration, there is no absolute right to 
collective action, despite D.R. Horton) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1748 (2012) (The “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensure[e] that private arbitration agreements 
are enforced according to their terms.”); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F.Supp.2d 
831, 844 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (D.R. Horton comes in conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act and 
enforcing individual arbitration agreements in lieu of collective claims does not destroy workers’ 
substantive rights under the work laws); Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 2012 WL 4754726  (S.D. 
Tex. 2012) (The court did not follow D.R. Horton because: other district courts failed to follow it, the 
NLRB had no authority to interpret the Federal Arbitration Act, no substantive statutory right was at 
play and there is strong federal policy favoring arbitration).  
 From a South American perspective, to the extent individual arbitration agreements circumvent 
the NLRA’s protections to workers, this decision under the FAA is a clear derogation of the NLRA. 
The courts misunderstand the protective principle inherent in the NLRA. Constitutionalizing worker 
protection through the Thirteenth Amendment is one way to compel courts to be clearer about the 
protective principle and choose the side of protection in cases where statutes and public policies may 
come in conflict. 
 206. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 at *17. 
 207. Id. at *1. 
 208. The agreement signed by the employee stated in relevant part, 
that all disputes and claims relating to the employee’s employment with Respondent (with 
exceptions not pertinent here) will be determined exclusively by final and binding arbitration; 
that the arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual claims,” “will not have the authority 
to consolidate the claims of other employees,” and “does not have authority to fashion a 
proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a group or class of employees 
in one arbitration proceeding”; and that the signatory employee waives “the right to file a  
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Section 7 of the NLRA protects workers’ rights to engage in concerted 
activities, be these traditional industrial actions such as strikes, pickets, 
and similar job actions, or judicially sanctioned collective and class 
actions under other laws, such as the FLSA.
209
  
 In fact, the Board argued that agreements barring workers from joining 
collective and class actions resemble the “yellow dog” contracts of the 
turn of the twentieth century,
210
 when employers made workers sign 
agreements promising not to join a union as a condition of employment. 
The Board not only recalled the protections for concerted activities for 
collective bargaining and mutual aid and protection under Section 7, but it 
also reiterated that the Act recognizes that there is an unequal power 
relationship between employees and employers inherent in the 
employment contract, and, therefore, there is a need to equalize the 
employment relationship through state protection of concerted activity.
211
 
As the Board stated,  
[i]n enacting the NLRA, Congress expressly recognized and sought 
to redress: “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between 
employees who do not possess full freedom of association . . . and 
employers who are organized in the corporate form or other forms 
of ownership association.” . . . . Congress vested employees with 
“full freedom of association . . . for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or 
protection,” in order to redress that inequality. 212 
 
 
lawsuit or other civil proceeding relating to Employee’s employment with the Company” and 
“the right to resolve employment-related disputes in a proceeding before a judge or jury.” 
Id.  
 209. As the NLRB stated, “[i]t is well settled that ‘mutual aid or protection’ includes employees’ 
efforts to ‘improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees 
through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.’” Id. at *2 (citing Eastex, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978)). 
 210. Id. at *5. As the NLRB stated in D.R. Horton, 
The Board has long held, with uniform judicial approval, that the NLRA protects employees’ 
ability to join together to pursue workplace grievances, including through litigation. Not long 
after the Act’s passage, the Board held that the filing of a Fair Labor Standards Act suit by 
three employees was protected concerted activity, as was an employee’s circulation of a 
petition among coworkers, designating him as their agent to seek back wages under the 
FLSA. In the decades that followed, the Board has consistently held that Section 7 protects 
concerted legal action addressing wages, hours or working conditions. 
Id. at * 2 (internal citations omitted). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of 
Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 1017 
(1996) (explaining why mandatory arbitration agreements are contemporary “yellow dog contracts.”). 
 211. Id. at *3. 
 212. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
650 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:605 
 
 
 
 
Since workers’ rights to join unions or otherwise act in concert for 
collective bargaining and for mutual aid and protection could be 
effectively destroyed by the modern version of the yellow dog contract, 
the NLRB declared the class suit waivers illegal and contrary to public 
policy.
213
 
D.R. Horton is a particularly insightful case regarding the manner in 
which the NLRA protects workers, because the case dealt with an 
employee’s right to engage in concerted activities, normally stemming 
from Section 7 of the NLRA. The authors underline that the NLRA does 
not explicitly state that collective claims pursued under a statute other than 
the NLRA are protected. However, the NLRB, with approval from the 
courts, has declared that under the policy objectives and the language of 
Section 7, existing federal labor law protects collective claims brought 
under the FLSA and other statutes. In this manner, the NLRB has 
interpreted the NLRA broadly to live up to the protective nature of the 
statute.
214
 A Latin American jurist would likely reach a similar conclusion. 
The U.S. Supreme Court also has argued that Section 7 rights provide 
broad support to employees seeking to act in concert for collective 
bargaining and for mutual aid and protection. The seminal case of NLRB v. 
Washington Aluminum
215
 held that a group of employees who walked off 
the job because the workplace premises were too cold were protected by 
Section 7 of the Act. The Court held that the employer could not 
summarily terminate the employees for acting in concert, for collective 
bargaining, and for mutual aid and protection, even if the employees 
violated company policies when they engaged in such acts.
216
 The narrow 
question before the Court was whether the NLRA protected the employee 
walkout if the workers had not presented a demand to the employer, prior 
to walking out.
217
 According to the employer, the workers’ failure to 
provide a demand made it impossible for the employer to resolve the issue, 
avoid industrial action, and workers’ violation of company policies.218 The 
employer maintained that the termination was “for cause” under the law 
 
 
 213. Id. at *8. 
 214. While D.R. Horton has not been followed by some circuit courts because of Federal 
Arbitration Act preemption or other reasons, these courts have erred. Moreover, the Board’s 
determination that workers who join class actions to seek redress of FLSA violations is protected 
under the NLRA. See Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted 
Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 AL. L. REV. 1013 (2013). 
 215. 370 U.S. 9 (1962). 
 216. Id. at 17. 
 217. Id. at 13–14. 
 218. Id. at 15–16. 
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and could not be declared an unfair labor practice.
219
 The employer argued 
that the NLRB could not order reinstatement, back-pay, or other remedies 
in favor of allegedly aggrieved workers.
220
 
The Supreme Court disagreed. Basing its decision on Section 7 of the 
Act, it held that the actions of the employees were protected. The Court 
reasoned, 
The language of § 7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities 
whether they take place before, after, or at the same time such a 
demand is made. To compel the Board to interpret and apply that 
language in the restricted fashion suggested by the respondent here 
would only tend to frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right 
of workers to act together to better their working conditions. 
Indeed, as indicated by this very case, such an interpretation of § 7 
might place burdens upon employees so great that it would 
effectively nullify the right to engage in concerted activities which 
that section protects. The seven employees here were part of a small 
group of employees who were wholly unorganized. They had no 
bargaining representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind 
to present their grievances to their employer. Under these 
circumstances, they had to speak for themselves as best they 
could.
221
 
Hence, even though the statute was silent as to whether employees needed 
to present a demand to the employer prior to engaging in collective action, 
the Court determined, based on Section 7, that such a demand was not 
necessary.
222
 Any other interpretation of the NLRA would have been 
likely to render Section 7 rights ineffective by placing obstacles in the way 
of workers’ concerted actions. Here, the Supreme Court resolved a gap in 
the law in favor of the workers given the protective purposes of the 
NLRA; a Latin American labor judge would have likely done similarly. 
Some may contest that the NLRA protects workers. One view of some 
American labor lawyers is that the NLRA does not provide any 
 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 16–17. According to Section 10(c) of the NLRA, “[n]o order of the Board shall require 
the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the 
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.” 
29 U.S.C. § 160(c). 
 221. Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. at 17–18. 
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substantive worker protections.
223
 Rather, they argue that the NLRA 
simply lends workers with a guarantee that they can organize in the same 
manner that capital has organized into corporations. The goal of the 
NLRA, according to this view, is to facilitate formal equality and 
contractual relations, even “freedom of contract” between capital and 
labor. The resilience of this freedom of contract view has some basis in the 
landmark Supreme Court case NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
224
 
where a divided Supreme Court found the NLRA constitutional on the 
grounds that the NLRA simply sought to extend to workers the same 
rights of organization that employers had.
225
 The law did not compel the 
parties to reach an agreement of any kind. Therefore neither the NLRB nor 
the courts could compel any party, a union or an employer, to agree to any 
term. As the Supreme Court stated in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
226
  
One of these fundamental policies is freedom of contract. While the 
parties’ freedom of contract is not absolute under the Act, allowing 
the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are 
unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the 
Act is based—private bargaining under governmental supervision of 
the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the 
actual terms of the contract.
227
 
Parties have to reach their agreement. The NLRB can merely supervise the 
bargaining procedure without compelling any substantive agreement. 
While the authors agree that the nature of collective bargaining is to 
provide for a private ordering of the workplace, an idea that is also central 
to Latin American work law under the principle of labor union autonomy, 
it is also true that such private ordering is collective and is protected by 
law, a public institution.
228
 Employers can agglomerate corporations, 
 
 
 223. See DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 449 (2009) 
(“Collective bargaining statutes reflect a policy determination that favors a privately ordered 
workplace over one controlled by direct government mandates . . .”). 
 224. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 225. Id. at 45 (“The act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does 
not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent the employer ‘from refusing to make a 
collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms’ the employer ‘may by unilateral action 
determine”). Moreover, since the Taft-Hartley Act, employers need only to “bargain in good faith” 
with the union. 29 U.S.C. 158(d). 
 226. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). 
 227. Id. at 108 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 228. The influential economic historian Karl Polanyi already detailed how pure self-regulated 
market societies are utopian. He showed that real market societies are embedded in social institutions 
including the state, debunking the stylized view that existing capitalist, market societies were mainly 
the product of private orderings. For example, modern markets required state policies to create money, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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partnerships and other groupings because of laws that legitimize such 
associations and provide liability limitations and other incentives to its 
stockowners and managers. Labor law facilitates the organization of 
unions and collective bargaining. Laws provide legal and, hence, public 
support to collective contractual relations and a private ordering of the 
workplace. Laws provide protections to those private markets and 
contracts. Implying that a law that helps workers to get a seat at the 
bargaining table with employers is merely a “governmental supervision of 
the procedure alone,” i.e., “procedural” and not “substantive,” conceals the 
NLRA’s real protections for workers to organize to equilibrate relations 
with a more powerful actor, the employer. 
In fact, even in H.K. Porter Co. the Supreme Court recognized the 
qualified nature of the “freedom of contract” principles inherent in the 
NLRA: 
[T]he employer is not free to choose any employee representative 
he wants, and the representative designated by the majority of the 
employees represents the minority as well. The Act itself prohibits 
certain contractual terms relating to refusals to deal in the goods of 
others. . . . Various practices in enforcing the Act may to some 
extent limit freedom to contract as the parties desire.
229
 
The law mandates with whom the employer may collectively bargain, and 
that collective actor must also represent the minority, not just the majority 
that supports it. Some terms cannot be bargained by the parties, such as 
terms relating to “hot cargos”.230 Yes, there is a collective, private ordering 
of the workplace, but those contours are shaped by law, a public 
institution. 
Moreover, and as argued earlier, to the extent labor law facilitates 
“freedom of contract,” it is only because it equalizes bargaining 
relationships between employers and workers. Otherwise, without this 
protection, workers would be treated as commodities; they would be 
incapable of meaningfully effecting their contractual relationships with 
employers. In fact, the scholarly authority cited by Supreme Court in H.K. 
Porter to defend its view of freedom of contract, former Yale Law School 
professor Harry F. Wellington, mentioned “freedom of contract” but only 
 
 
labor and land markets required for capitalist development. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 201–08 (Beacon Press 
1957). 
 229. H. K. Porter, 387 U.S. at 108. 
 230. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). 
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as a shortened form of the term “collective freedom of contract”—a 
legislative goal inherent in the NLRA, as stated by Professor Wellington: 
Among the many competing goals of national labor policy, two 
have been frequently proclaimed and staunchly defended, almost 
but never quite to the death, by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. One is industrial peace; the other is freedom of contract—
collective contract, to be sure.
231
 
Hence, the NLRA has a goal to facilitate publicly guarded, collective 
contractual relations by protecting workers to organize and bargain with 
the employer.
232
 In effect, for workers to be free, as understood in the 
Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and as argued earlier, the 
government must intervene in employment relations. 
Moreover, as explained above, the NLRA is not just about collective 
bargaining. Section 7, as clearly explained in Washington Aluminum, also 
protects workers who lack union representation, have made no prior 
demands to the employer and wish to protect themselves from abuse at the 
workplace.
233
 The NLRA is more than a contractual statute. Moreover, 
viewed through the Latin American perspective, the NLRA can be 
construed as legislative action necessary to enforce the U.S.’ constitutional 
protection of work under the Thirteenth Amendment. When workers band 
together and walk out to protect themselves from abuse at work, they are 
not only protected by the NLRA but also by the Constitution, which 
safeguards the freedom and dignity of all Americans. 
Others may argue that while the words of the NLRA and some 
outstanding cases such as Washington Aluminum provide worker 
protections, American courts have “de-radicalized” and otherwise 
hollowed-out the NLRA. James Atleson, for example, argued that hidden 
“values and assumptions” of American decisional labor law stemming 
from the class biases of judges and the status assumptions that society 
makes of workers helped to erode the NLRA.
234
 These corrosive values 
and assumptions for labor law have been that employers have a right to 
 
 
 231. Harry H. Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. 
PA. L. REV. 467 (1964) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 232. We should note that the common law understands some circumstances where parties have 
differing degrees of bargaining power, rendering contracts unenforceable, such as in the doctrine of 
unconscionable contracts. Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari & Perillo on Contracts § 9.38 (6th ed. 2009). 
However, work law does not aim at rendering employment contracts unenforceable, but as we have 
been arguing here, at protecting workers so that more legitimate contracts can be formed in the 
employment relationship.  
 233. Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S., at 15–18. 
 234. ATLESON, supra note 12, at 5. 
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maintain production, employees will act irresponsibility if not controlled, 
employees can only be minor partners in managing an enterprise, 
employers own the workplace, and employee participation interferes with 
the inherent and exclusive managerial rights of employers.
235
 According to 
Atleson, these values and assumptions run in the common law where 
collective action by workers has been esteemed illegitimate and illegal and 
where only rational, individual action, rather than collective self-help is 
justified by law.
236
 These values have been central in the evisceration of 
the right to organize and to strike in the U.S. through the doctrine of 
permanent economic strike replacements, among others.
237
 
Similar to Atleson, Professor Karl Klare argued that a “radical” 
interpretation of the Wagner Act, which was reasonable at the time it was 
enacted, was hindered by the courts and other institutional actors that 
domesticated the statute.
238
 According to Klare, the NLRA had six 
vaguely-stated but nevertheless cognizable goals: industrial peace, 
collective bargaining, equalization of bargaining power, free choice of 
workers to join a union, rationalization of the market to stop under-
consumption, and industrial democracy.
239
 Of these goals, the more radical 
ones were rationalization of the market, which included wealth 
redistribution, equalizing bargaining power, and industrial democracy.
240
 
These goals, however, “were jettisoned as serious components of national 
labor policy.”241 In turn, “industrial peace, collective bargaining as 
therapy, a safely cabined worker free choice, and some rearrangement of 
relative bargaining power survived judicial construction of the Act.”242 
While the Wagner Act’s goals were vague, it could have been reasonably 
 
 
 235. Id. at 8–9. 
 236. Id. at 5–9; see also Klare, supra note 12, at 265; DANNIN, supra note 12, at 58–59. 
 237. Pope, Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor, supra note 129, at 1541. Employers can 
employ permanent strike replacement to the workplace of unions. The employer strategy normally 
goes this way: During contract negotiations the employer bargains to impasse. It then unilaterally 
implements terms and conditions of employment, which is legal once impasse occurs. The union may 
then call a strike to support its bargaining position. In response, the employer permanently replaces the 
striking workers, which is legal under the law. Finally, the employer may file for a decertification 
election with the NLRB where the permanent strike replacements can vote. See JULIUS GETMAN, THE 
BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS, AND PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS, 31–40, 192–
200 (1998). The practice has proven devastating in key cases. See id. at 224–28. See also DAU-
SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 223, at 614. 
 238. Klare, supra note 12. 
 239. Id. at 282–83. 
 240. Id. at 293. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 292–93. 
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interpreted in a more “radical” manner. Courts ensured that radical 
interpretation did not occur.  
As the authors argued above, constitutionalization of worker protection 
through the Thirteenth Amendment would help to limit judicial erosion of 
labor rights. A Latin American jurist would find him or herself hard-
pressed to confirm any immanent employer right to permanently replace 
strikers, for example, given a constitutional protection of workers and a 
statute which clearly states in Section 13 that, “Nothing in this subchapter, 
except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to 
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to 
affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”243 With such legal 
foundations, judges would interpret the right to strike to be part and parcel 
of Congress’ authority to enforce the Constitutional ban on involuntary 
servitude. Under the language of the statute, the policies on which it is 
based, and the Constitutional ban against involuntary servitude, the Latin 
American jurist would be similarly hard-pressed to find other commercial 
interests more important to look after than workers’ needs to be free. 
We must also clarify that even if NLRA has been judicially 
domesticated, this does not mean that the protective principle is entirely 
absent from it. Under the current NLRA, workers can act in concert in 
protest of workplace hazards thanks to the NLRA’s protective principle. 
Workers can proselytize at work in non-working areas of the employer and 
during their own time, as long as the issues are related in some fashion to 
their terms and conditions of employment.
244
 To the extent courts have 
narrowed U.S. work law protections, they could broaden them in future 
cases if persuaded that the law lends itself to protective interpretations 
favorable to weaker parties. 
There is also the argument that the NLRA has been significantly 
amended by the legislature to favor employers, particularly through the 
Taft Hartley Act of 1947. Taft-Hartley was decried by organized labor at 
the time as the “slave labor bill.”245 Its most controversial provisions, or at 
least the ones most resisted by unions, included the creation of labor union 
unfair labor practices,
246
 which encompass, most importantly, banning 
secondary activities strikes and boycotts,
247
 protecting employer speech 
 
 
 243. 29 U.S.C. § 163.  
 244.  Eastex, 437 U.S 556.  
 245. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1609 n.263 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
 246. 42 U.S.C. § 8(b). 
 247. 42 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4). 
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during union elections,
248
 excluding certain employees from labor law 
protections,
249
 allowing states to enact legislation to permit employee free 
riding (so-called “right to work laws”),250 and amending Section 7 so that 
workers’ negative rights of association (to not join a union) would be 
enforced,
251
 among others.
252
 
However, the NLRA’s protection of employees survived even through 
the Taft-Hartley Amendments. As Professor Ellen Dannin has argued, 
rights favoring workers’ collective action for their mutual aid and 
protection were not changed by the Taft-Hartley Amendments.
253
 The 
NLRA still punishes actions by employers who try to curb workers’ 
collective rights. In fact, stating that the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted to 
protect employers is not wholly correct since some sections arguably 
benefit both employees and employers, such as the right to not join the 
union when the employee understands that a particular labor organization 
will not represent his or her interests. Certainly, the Taft-Hartley Act 
slimmed down the Wagner Act’s original protection of workers’ rights, 
but the core of those protections remains.
254
 Additionally, if on top of the 
existing protections there is a constitutional protection of work under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the NLRA remains, or at least has the potential to 
be, solidly protective. Understanding legal principles, and particularly the 
protective principle of work law, provides a different interpretation of U.S. 
 
 
 248. Id. § 8(c). For a review of pro-labor critiques of the employer speech rights clause, see Craig 
Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 495, 516–23 (1993) (Employers and workers are locked in unequal bargaining 
relationships and the union election model of the NLRA has fostered the wrong impression that unions 
and employers square off as equals in election campaigns, just as political parties in government 
elections.); James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for 
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832 (2005) (“When an employer delivers a series of 
forceful messages that unionization is looked upon with extreme disfavor, the impact upon employees 
is likely to reflect their perceptions about the speaker’s basic power over their work lives rather than 
the persuasive content of the words themselves. Captive audience speeches, oblique or direct threats to 
act against union supporters, and intense personal campaigning by supervisors are among the lawful or 
borderline lawful techniques that have proven especially effective in diminishing union support or 
defeating unionization over the years.”); Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and 
Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 372–73 (2001) (Neutrality agreements can redress four disadvantages unions 
confront when organizing: employer intimidation, harmful delay, inadequate access to employees, and 
inability to secure a first contract.)  
 249. 42 U.S.C. § 9. 
 250. Id. § 14(b). 
 251. Id. § 7. 
 252. See DAU SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 223, at 68–71. 
 253. DANNIN, supra note 12, at 71. 
 254. See id.  
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work law, one that is more consistently in favor of workers and the NLRA 
itself. 
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROTECTIVE NATURE OF U.S. WORK LAW 
While the authors argue that a Latin American labor judge would find 
something like the Latin American protective principle in U.S. work law, 
the authors expect further objections to their claims. The objections will 
likely state that: 
 The peculiar American doctrine of “employment-at-will,” which 
exists in all U.S. states except Montana, underpins the edifice of 
U.S. work law, making American work law un-protective. 
 The protective principle and something like the rule in dubio pro 
operario is nothing more than a new name for the obsolete 
common law legal maxim that “remedial statutes must be 
liberally interpreted.” According to Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Bryan A. Garner,
255
 the legal formulation that remedial statutes 
must be legally construed is “incomprehensible or superfluous” 
because (1) all statutes are “remedial,” so all deserve a “liberal” 
reading and (2) modern textualism posits that all statutes must be 
“fairly” interpreted, so there is no need for “liberal” construction 
of statutes.  
While legal principles provide a compass to navigate the “stormy seas”256 
of work law, including U.S. work law, the authors agree that employment-
at-will considerably weakens existing work law, even with further 
constitutional protection through the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. To fully protect workers Congress must extinguish 
employment-at-will through preemptive federal law. On the other hand, 
the brand of American textualism espoused by figures such as Justice 
Scalia and Professor Garner is too narrow. Statutes that derogate the 
common law, such as those related to work, require a liberal reading in 
favor of workers, not just a “fair” reading or the same “liberal” reading 
that any other statute would require. Legislative purpose can help us 
determine how “liberal” or protective a statutory construction needs to be. 
Certainly, a constitutional protection of work under the Thirteenth 
 
 
 255. ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF TEXTS 
5084 (Kindle ed. 2012). 
 256. See Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1655, 1657 (1995–1996) [hereinafter Estlund, Wrongful Discharge]. 
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Amendment would further compel us to give existing labor protective 
statutes an even stronger “liberal” interpretation. 
A. Employment-at-Will Erodes Protection  
Some may argue that U.S. work law is not protective because the 
centuries old “employment-at-will” doctrine prevails. The American 
employment-at-will doctrine, in its bare and traditional formulation, states 
that employers and employees may terminate their employment 
relationship for good, bad, or no reason.
257
 In other words, unlike the law 
in all other industrial democracies, the U.S. employment-at-will doctrine 
does not require “cause” or “just cause” for termination of the employment 
contract. With zero protections afforded by what appears to be the baseline 
rule of American work law, how can American work law be protective? 
Even if some statutes such as the NLRA and FLSA protect workers, these 
seem to be mere islands of protection in a wide, lonely sea of non-
protection. 
First, the authors do not consider the American common law rule of 
employment-at-will to be part of “work law.” From a Latin American 
perspective, work law is statutory and derogates the common law (or the 
civil law in civil law jurisdictions) because of the common law’s failure to 
adequately consider the subordination of employees in the employment 
relationship. By definition, the authors exclude employment-at-will from 
the U.S. work law, such as the way Brazilian labor courts excluded civil 
law tenets from its jurisprudence.
258
  
Second, from an empirical treatment of U.S. law, there is a law of 
“wrongful discharge”259 in the U.S. derived from statutory protections 
against discriminatory and retaliatory discharges.
260
 The crude rule of 
employment-at-will under which “bad” reasons can justify termination is 
no longer the rule.
261
 Legal scholars and social scientists have even shown 
how workplace protections against wrongful discharge are so widely 
 
 
 257. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884) (“Obviously the law can adopt 
and maintain no such standards for judging human conduct; and men must be left, without interference 
to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no 
cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.”). 
 258. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 152–53 (2d ed. 1985) (Explaining 
how micro-systems of law have developed in civil law countries which compete with the traditional 
civil law, rendering the traditional civil law as “residual.”). 
 259. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 256, at 1662. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 1656. 
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recognized that many employers overzealously guard themselves against 
liability when they terminate employees.
262
 
It has also been argued that employment-at-will is the backdrop against 
which wrongful discharge causes of action are litigated. In such a 
backdrop, workers, not employers, are the ones who must prove that “bad” 
causes motivate terminations. Even with burden-shifting tests under equal 
opportunity law, employees retain the final, practical burden to prove their 
cases. The employment-at-will backdrop is different from “for cause” or 
“just cause” regimes because in those jurisdictions employers, rather than 
employees, must prove that the termination was lawful.
263
 Hence, for 
example, Professor Cynthia Estlund argues that considerations regarding 
proof and correlative issues regarding delay and cost of the litigation to 
workers make it difficult for workers to bring suit and win cases even 
under statutory work laws that protect workers.
264
 
The authors must agree with Professor Cynthia Estlund. Employment-
at-will erodes work law. This means that employment-at-will, a lingering 
relic of master-servant law,
265
 must be statutorily rescinded for statutory 
work law to be more effective in the U.S.
266
 The authors suggest that such 
statute should be federal to lay a floor for the entire U.S. It should be 
anchored in the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. constitution, for the 
reasons laid out above. 
All this said, the authors cannot overstate the fact that work law is still 
quite real in the U.S., as are its protections. Workers can engage in 
concerted activity in the absence of a union to protest unhealthy work 
environments. They must also be compensated for donning and doffing, 
among many other protections. These are real workplace protections 
enacted by the U.S. Congress and judicially recognized. U.S. work law 
could be more protective, but it is protective, nevertheless. 
 
 
 262. Cynthia Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About their Rights and Why Does it Matter?, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 11 (2002). 
 263. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 256, at 1691. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Laura A. Turczanski, Closing the Door on the Public Policy Exception to At-Will 
Employment: How The Washington State Supreme Court Erroneously Foreclosed Wrongful Discharge 
Claims For Whistleblowers in Cudney v. Alsco, Inc., 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 2025, 2027 n.11 (2013) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 266. See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 
62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment-at-Will, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1 (2010). For a “Latin” view of a dismissal statute from within the U.S. see Jorge 
M. Farinacci-Fernós, The Search For A Wrongful Dismissal Statute: A Look At Puerto Rico’s Act No. 
80 As A Potential Starting Point, 17 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 125 (2013) (arguing that the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is the only American jurisdiction with a strong pro-worker “for cause” 
dismissal statute and can serve as the basis for other dismissal statutes in the U.S.). 
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B. Work Law Deserves Liberal Interpretation in Favor of the Worker 
There has been an age-old legal maxim in the common law that 
remedial statutes must be construed liberally. According to the eminent 
common law jurist William Blackstone, remedial statutes are: 
those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such 
superfluities, in the common law, as arise [from] either the general 
imperfection of all human laws, from change of time and 
circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised determinations of 
unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause 
whatsoever.
267
  
Liberal construction generally has been said to mean that statues that are 
remedial and change the common law should not be construed 
“strictly.”268  
However, Justice Scalia and Professor Garner have argued that all 
statutes change the common law and, as such, are “remedial.”269 
Therefore, the maxim that remedial statutes deserve a liberal construction 
makes no sense. All statutes are remedial, so all statutes must be construed 
“liberally.”270  
Moreover, according to Justice Scalia and Professor Garner, modern 
textualism posits that all statutes deserve a “fair reading,”271 not “strict 
construction.” No serious, modern jurist would argue that statutes today 
deserve only a “strict” construction. If “fair” and “liberal” mean “not 
strict,” then the legal maxim that remedial statutes require a “liberal” 
construction has, in addition to being incomprehensible, become 
“superfluous.”272  
The Latin American perspective is at odds with the textualism of 
Justice Scalia and Professor Garner. Under the Latin American perspective 
remedial statutes do deserve a special reading, perhaps a “liberal” one. Not 
all statutes deserve the same type of “fair” reading. There is a difference 
 
 
 267. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 255, at 5069 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 86 (4th ed. 1770)). 
 268. Id. at 5090. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 5070. 
 271. A fair reading requires “determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the 
basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at 
the time it was issued. The endeavor requires aptitude in language, sound judgment, the suppression of 
personal preferences regarding the outcome, and, with older texts, historical linguistic research.” Id. at 
814. 
 272. Id. at 5090. 
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between statutes that add to existing common (or civil) law and those that 
derogate—that in fact completely change—aspects of the common law to 
protect weaker parties or to otherwise safeguard rights that traditional, 
individual, and private ordering cannot do.
273
 Work law is precisely this 
type of law that completely changes the common law—that turns it on its 
head. 
To understand the manner by which statutes derogate important 
principles of the common law, judges and other adjudicators need to pay 
attention to principles, as we have been arguing for in this article. In the 
U.S., principles are derived from the purposes of laws, including their 
consequences, and the legislative debates from where they were born.
274
 
Justice Scalia and Professor Garner frown upon the use of “purpose” to 
understand statutes because, among other reasons, they believe that using 
purpose leads to undue manipulations of the law.
275
 However, as Justice 
Breyer has argued, textualism, the brand of statutory construction that 
Justice Scalia and Garner advocate for, suffers from the flaw that words in 
a text can have too many meanings to provide the basis for consistent legal 
interpretations.
276
 Moreover, using legislative purposes is warranted in 
statutory interpretation not only because it helps judges and other 
adjudicators provide a better understanding of the law, but also because 
legislative writing staffs themselves use “general or imprecise terms while 
relying on committee reports, statements of members delivered on the 
floor of Congress, legislative hearings” and other materials to draft 
laws.
277
 In other words, legislators use purpose to build their legal texts. 
Therefore, Congress must also count on courts to use purpose to 
understand its laws.
278
 
A Latin American jurist, in the authors’ view, would agree with the 
American “purpositivists” in this regard. In order to understand the law, 
adjudicators need to search beyond the pure text and understand the 
purposes of the law, which are also contained in the principles of law. It is 
in this light, in the attempt to find what undergirds law, that, for example, 
 
 
 273. As an important treatise on statutory interpretation reads,  
When a statute is both in derogation of the common law and remedial in nature, the rule of 
strict construction should not be applied to frustrate the legislative intent; the statute should 
be construed liberally in order to give effect to the legislation. 
3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 60:1 (7th ed. 2007). 
 274. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 89–92 (2010). 
 275. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 255, at 602. 
 276. BREYER, supra note 274, at 97. 
 277. Id.  
 278. Id. 
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the Uruguayan court recognized the so-called “complex employer” liable 
for the wages of the employees of its contractors, even if positive law was 
silent about such liability or even about the existence of a so-called 
“complex employer.”279 
The maxim that one should give a “liberal” reading of a remedial 
statute parallels the rule of in dubio pro operario, to the extent a “liberal” 
reading includes an understanding of how the statute aims to benefit 
weaker parties; inasmuch as it does, the maxim makes significant sense 
from a Latin American perspective. A Latin American judge may further 
argue that some statutes deserve more liberal interpretation than others if 
the law attempts to protect high ordered goals such as human dignity and 
to protect the weak.  
CONCLUSION 
Latin American work law, coming from a civil law tradition, contains a 
body of systemic principles. The principles can be gleaned from the 
constitutions and statutes of the region. These principles include the 
principle of protection, primacy of reality, non-waiver of statutory rights, 
employment stability, and labor union autonomy, as elaborated above.  
This Article was concerned with the first principle, the principle of 
protection, which is central to Latin American work law. The principle of 
protection posits that the law must protect the worker because workers are 
weaker parties in employment contracts. Without protection, the worker 
would be turned into a commodity and his or her humanity would be 
threatened. The law must aid in correcting this moral concern. 
The authors also described how the principle of protection has led to 
the development of the rule of in dubio pro operario, which means that 
when deciding hard cases a judge must interpret the relevant rule in the 
way most favorable to the worker. We saw that a different but similarly 
pro-worker rule exists in France and Germany, under the rule or principle 
“of favor.” While each rule or principle posits slightly different things, all 
show the same intent: to favor the worker in hard cases. 
We argued that a Latin American jurist would likely find the principle 
of protection in the U.S. The judge would agree with American legal 
scholars who argue for the extension of the Thirteenth Amendment to 
ordinary employment contracts and work laws. The whole reason behind 
labor protection in Latin America is to protect workers from 
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commodification and affronts to human dignity, goals that are closely 
paralleled by the Thirteenth Amendment. Hence, the Latin American labor 
judge would find labor protection in the involuntary servitude clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, which similarly protects workers, as they are weaker 
parties in employment relations. In doing so, the judge would better 
cement labor protection in the general legal landscape of the U.S. and 
guard existing work law statutes against encroachments by commercial 
interests that are hostile to work law and limit workers’ freedom. 
Similarly, a Latin American labor judge would find that the NLRA and 
the FLSA are concerned about the disparate bargaining relationships 
between workers and employers. Both laws protect workers to equilibrate 
power relations. Latin American labor jurists would recognize that while 
in Latin America the law is concerned about commodification as a moral 
concern resulting from disparate bargaining positions, in the U.S. the law 
is more concerned with market failures and “obstructions to commerce” 
produced by said inequities. The Latin American labor judge would 
recognize that the commercial goals behind the U.S. laws open some 
opportunities for erosions of workers’ protections. However, the statutes 
still protect workers. Moreover, if the statutes find further constitutional 
grounding in the Thirteenth Amendment, they can be read in a more 
protective light. All this said, Latin American labor jurists would 
recognize that the statutes protect. 
The authors also argued that something similar to the rule of in dubio 
pro operario exists in the U.S. under the legal maxim that remedial 
statutes should be interpreted liberally. While textualists such as Justice 
Scalia and Professor Garner have argued against the relevance of that 
American canon of statutory interpretation, the authors argue that the 
canon remains valuable if one considers the protective purposes inherent 
in work law, which derogates the common law to rebalance power 
asymmetries. If anything, a Latin American labor judge would argue that 
work law would require an even more liberal interpretation than other laws 
given its goals to correct inequalities and safeguard human dignity. 
We hope that with this introduction to the Latin American principle of 
protection and the authors’ view of how it could be expressed in U.S. work 
law, the authors can start a conversation with and among U.S. work law 
scholars and lawyers about the underpinnings of their own work law. 
Professor Michael Zimmer has already sounded an alarm bell, cautioning 
against the soft codification of American employment law through an 
American Law Institute restatement without first identifying the principles 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/5
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of American work law.
280
 The authors’ attempt in this Article is to move 
the discussion in that principled direction. 
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